The choice between formal and informal intellectual property: A review by Hall, B et al.
Journal of Economic Literature 2014, 52(2), 375–423
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.52.2.375
375
Trade secret law provides far weaker protection 
in many respects than the patent law. [. . .] The 
possibility that an inventor who believes his 
invention meets the standards of patentability 
will sit back, rely on trade secret law, and 
after one year of use forfeit any right to patent 
protection [. . .] is remote indeed.
US Supreme Court (Kewanee Oil Co. 
v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 1974)
Judges and lawyers have sometimes thought 
that because trade secret law provides less 
protection to the inventor than patent law does, 
no rational person with a patentable invention 
would fail to seek a patent. […] This reasoning 
is incorrect.
Friedman, Landes, and Posner 
 (1991: 62–63)
1. Introduction
$500,000 per patent: this figure circulated widely following Google’s announce-
ment of its takeover of Motorola (Economist 
17vAugust 2011). This value is obtained by 
dividing the price paid by Google for the 
acquisition of Motorola (US$12.5 billion) 
by the number of patents held by Motorola 
(24,000). Applying a similar logic, the acqui-
sition of the patents assigned to Canadian 
Nortel by a consortium of firms in July 2011 
yields an even higher price tag of $750,000 
per patent.1 These figures may seem 
1 The consortium comprised Microsoft, Apple, Ericsson, 
EMC, Sony, and Research in Motion.
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extreme, however, data covering a broader 
range of patent transactions suggests that the 
average price of traded United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) patents in 
2012 was around $370,000.2 Comparing the 
trading value of commercial secrets is more 
difficult, since the trading of secrets is, by 
definition, much harder to observe empiri-
cally, but some figures can still be obtained 
from court rulings. For example, in a recent 
ruling by a federal court in Virginia in 
September 2011, Kolon Industries Inc. was 
held liable to paying DuPont Co. the amount 
of $919.9 million for the theft of 149 trade 
secrets related to the production of Kevlar, 
a special fiber (Bloomberg 15 September 
2011). This suggests an average value of $6.3 
million per trade secret. 
These computations are certainly naïve, 
but the figures nevertheless indicate that 
firms use both patents and trade secrets to 
protect valuable inventions and, contrary to 
a commonly encountered belief, patents may 
not necessarily protect a company’s most 
valuable inventions. Such inventions may be 
kept secret despite being patentable.
The economics literature has focused over-
whelmingly on the use of patents by com-
panies as a means to appropriating returns 
to innovation.3 Recent events related to the 
enforcement of patents on digital data trans-
mission technologies in courts around the 
globe have reinforced the impression that 
innovation—in particular high-tech innova-
tion—is inextricably linked with patents. The 
previously cited court case on the misappro-
priation of Kevlar trade secrets, however, 
shows that firms choose secrecy over pat-
enting, even for high-tech products that are 
patentable. In fact, the available empirical 
evidence, which is reviewed in more detail 
below, strongly suggests that only a small 
2  IPOfferings LLC Patent Value Quotient 2012.
3 For the origins of the literature, see Schmookler 
(1966) and Comanor and Scherer (1969).
fraction of innovative companies relies on 
patents to protect their inventions. Hall et al. 
(2013), for example, show that, even among 
UK companies that conduct some form of 
R&D and report to have had an innovation, 
only around 4 percent apply for a patent. 
This is much lower than would be expected 
if companies protected innovations through 
patents by default. In fact, the available 
survey-based evidence indicates that com-
panies report heavier reliance on alternative 
mechanisms, such as lead time and secrecy 
(e.g., Levin et al. 1987; Cohen et al. 2000; 
Arundel 2001). The present article sets out 
to explore what we know about companies’ 
choices of how to protect their inventions, 
which is directly linked with the question of 
how companies appropriate returns to their 
innovations.
It turns out the answers to these questions 
are far from obvious. Companies have the 
choice between a range of mechanisms to pro-
tect their innovative activities and output. On 
the one hand, they can choose formal intel-
lectual property (IP), which includes patents, 
trademarks, registered designs, and copyright. 
On the other hand, firms can choose a range of 
“alternative” or informal appropriation mech-
anisms, such as secrecy, confidentiality agree-
ments, lead time, or complexity. This paper 
reviews the theoretical and empirical litera-
ture concerning the choice among formal IP 
and informal appropriation mechanisms and 
combinations of these mechanisms in provid-
ing incentives for invention and innovation, as 
well as in shaping a firm’s ability to commer-
cially exploit its knowledge. 
Formal IP is designed to provide ex ante 
incentives to innovate by providing a reward 
system that makes it easier for innovators 
to make ex post profits if their innovation is 
successful by allowing them to exclude imita-
tors for a finite period. The financial reward 
to an IP holder derives from the legal right 
to exclude others from using the innovation 
and addresses the fundamental problem of 
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appropriability that governs the production 
of knowledge (Arrow 1962). Appropriability 
is a concern for inventors, since one of the 
outputs of inventive and innovation activity 
is often knowledge, a nonexcludable intangi-
ble asset. Hence, it is difficult to keep others 
from using this knowledge at a fraction of the 
initial cost of the invention development.4 
Although there may be important addi-
tional reasons for setting up an IP system, 
the appropriability problem is usually con-
sidered to be the basic economic justifica-
tion for an IP system, because such a system 
allows the inventor/innovator to appropriate 
most of the returns from the initial innova-
tion investment by excluding third parties 
from using the innovation. Nevertheless, in 
practice, invention and innovation do occur 
even if firms cannot access, or choose not 
to use, the IP system. As will be reviewed 
herein, firms use a range of mechanisms— 
such as secrecy or first mover advantage—by 
which they appropriate rewards to invention 
and innovation and the available empirical 
evidence suggests that firms rely on these 
alternative mechanisms much more than on 
formal IP.5
From a social point of view, granting a 
temporary property right on an innovation, 
for example in the form of a patent, is jus-
tified on the basis that the inventor is, in 
exchange, required to explain the innovation 
in a specific, standardized technical format 
(that can be read and understood by quali-
fied third parties). The economic justifica-
tion for this disclosure is to allow other firms 
to avoid duplication of research, possibly 
4 In some cases, the fraction may be fairly large, in that 
successful imitation is costly even when the imitator has 
acquired the relevant knowledge (Mansfield, Schwartz, 
and Wagner 1981). 
5 In basic terms, one can think of invention as being 
only the first step in a complex process with the end point 
being a successful innovation. Formally, a patent describes 
the invention, and not the innovation that may come later. 
In this paper, we do not generally refer to this distinction 
unless it is critical. 
acquire  useful knowledge and, when the pat-
ent expires, quickly imitate the innovation. 
These issues are stressed by endogenous 
growth theories, which demonstrate the 
importance of knowledge spillovers among 
firms and sectors for sustained long-run 
growth (Romer 1990). In this respect, the 
disclosure of knowledge required by a pat-
ent application, at least theoretically, allows 
knowledge to reach other firms and indi-
vidual inventors and may help avoid wasteful 
duplication of research efforts; secrecy, on 
the contrary, may hinder the circulation of 
new ideas and therefore slow down knowl-
edge spillovers and economic growth.6
The availability and use of the different 
appropriability regimes differ across tech-
nologies and sectors; some of the differences 
are due to differences in legal systems and 
exogenous characteristics of the technolo-
gies employed. Endogenous industry demo-
graphics and market structure also account 
for some of the observable heterogeneity 
across industries in firms’ choices between 
formal and informal IP. However, the appro-
priability regime also depends on firms’ stra-
tegic competitive behavior as discussed in 
detail further below.
The main forms of formal IP are patents, 
trademarks, designs, and copyright.7 The 
first three of these are registered rights, 
while copyright is an unregistered right. In 
addition, trade secrecy can also be regarded 
as a part of IP, although in most com-
mon law countries, including the United 
Kingdom and the United States, trade secret 
law forms part of common law and, there-
fore, its  protection is weaker than in other 
6 However, there is a debate about to what extent firms 
use patent documents to obtain information. See section 5 
for more detailed discussion.
7 Other registered IP includes plant breeders’ rights and 
semiconductor topography (mask) rights. Other unregis-
tered IP includes unregistered designs, unregistered trade-
marks, and company symbols.
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 countries.8 Since the underlying mechanisms 
differ for registered and unregistered IP, we 
distinguish in this review between registered 
IP, paying particular attention to patents as 
they protect technologies, and unregistered 
IP in the form of copyright as well as most 
informal mechanisms. Informal IP may 
take various forms; secrecy, confidentiality 
agreements, lead time, and complexity (of 
design) are subsumed under the informal IP 
heading.9 Similar to unregistered formal IP, 
informal IP remains, by construction, largely 
unobservable or only partially observable 
to third parties, which creates a formidable 
challenge for empirical work, as will be dis-
cussed in detail below.
The fundamental question that we address 
in this review is the following: for what rea-
sons would a firm with a given innovation 
8 Since enforcement through common law is diffi-
cult in practice, trade secrets are often enforced through 
specific contracts, such as confidentiality or nondisclo-
sure agreements. Although these documents are not a 
legal requirement for the enforcement of trade secrets in 
court, Almeling et al. (2010, 2011) present evidence for 
the United States that the secret owner is more likely to 
prevail against employees or business partners if such an 
agreement exists.
9 The “informal” label does not imply the absence of 
legal contracts and obligations.
that can be protected by formal IP choose 
not to rely on such IP to protect an innova-
tion? In search of explanations for this type 
of firm behavior, we review the theoretical 
literature and assess the empirical evidence 
to determine which of the theoretical argu-
ments are supported by the available data. As 
we will discuss below, the existing evidence 
shows that there are enormous differences 
in the use of IP at the firm-level—differ-
ences that are beyond expected differences 
in the applicability of IP (especially patents) 
to firms’ innovations.10 The evidence avail-
able from various firm-level surveys, which 
is reviewed herein, suggests that on average, 
firms rely more on informal than formal IP to 
protect their inventions, and that most firms 
use no IP protection at all. 
Table 1 uses data collated from the UK 
Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) to 
illustrate this point.11 The table shows the 
percent share (using sampling weights to 
produce population estimates) of companies 
indicating medium or high importance to 
the company of all formal and informal IP 
10 See for example Rogers (2007).
11 These data come from the UK CIS 3, 4, and 5, cover-
ing the years 1998–2006.
TABLE 1 
Importance of Different IP Mechanisms to UK Firms 1998–2006 (%)
All firms Innovators
Formal IP 10.6 27.7
Patents 10.3 25.8
Informal IP 18.9 48.5
Secrecy 21.0 45.3
Note: Formal IP contains patents, trademarks, registered designs, and copyright; informal IP contains secrecy, lead 
time, complexity, confidentiality.
Data Source: UK ONS CIS 3, 4, and 5; table contains population-weighted shares based on 38,760 observations.
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protection mechanisms, as well as patenting 
and the use of secrecy individually. It shows 
that only 10–11 percent of firms rate formal 
IP or patent protection as of medium or 
high importance, whereas about 20 percent 
rate some form of informal IP or secrecy as 
important. 
Of course, one reason for not using IP 
protection is that there is nothing that needs 
protecting. In the second column of table 1, 
we look at the importance rating of IP for 
the 30 percent of firms that have innovated 
during the past three years. These firms are 
indeed more likely to consider IP protection 
important, with 26–28 percent rating for-
mal IP or patents as important and almost 
half rating informal IP or secrecy as impor-
tant. But that still means that about half the 
innovating firms do not think IP is of much 
importance. 
Table 2, drawn from the U.S. National 
Science Foundation’s new Business R&D 
and Innovation Survey (BRDIS) survey, 
shows similar results for U.S. firms. Looking 
at all firms in all industries, only a small frac-
tion find any form of IP important to them, 
and the rank of importance in terms of the 
share of firms is trademark, trade secret, 
copyright, design patent, and utility patent. 
When only R&D-doing firms are consid-
ered, the shares of somewhat important and 
very important increase substantially, as one 
might expect. In this case, utility patents are 
still not as important as the other types of IP 
rights, with the exception of design patents. 
Hence, understanding why firms may pre-
fer alternative methods to protect their IP is 
at the heart of understanding the functioning 
of the IP system. If the objective of the IP 
system is to provide incentives to innovate, 
an improved understanding of why firms 
choose to rely on formal IP to protect inno-
vations in some circumstances but not in 
 others has direct implications for the design 
of mechanisms that set optimal incentives 
for firms to innovate.
Our review complements a number of 
existing literature reviews that have looked at 
the choice between different mechanisms to 
protect inventions. Anton, Greene, and Yao 
(2006) look at the choice between patents 
and secrecy within the context of weak pat-
ents (i.e., patents that stand a high chance of 
revocation in postgrant administrational or 
court proceedings). Their discussion focuses 
on the trade-off between strategically dis-
closing information to soften competition 
and the effectiveness of patents in  protecting 
TABLE 2 
Importance of Different IP Mechanisms to U.S. Firms in 2008 (%)
All firms R&D-doing firms
Utility patent  5 41
Design patent  6 33
Trademark 15 60
Copyright 12 50
Trade secret 14 67
Note: Population-weighted share of firms that rate the IP mechanism as somewhat or very important to their firm.
Source: National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, Business R&D and 
Innovation Survey 2008. Rows may not sum to one hundred due to rounding.
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the disclosed information. Encaoua, Guellec, 
and Martínez (2006) also survey the litera-
ture on companies’ decisions to patent. Their 
interest lies in reviewing the available evi-
dence on whether the patent system encour-
ages innovation.
There are some related topics that our sur-
vey does not cover. First, we have not consid-
ered the extensive literature on the private 
and social value of IP rights of all kinds, nor 
the use of IPRs as indicators of value. For 
these topics, see Griliches (1990) on patents 
as indicators, Lanjouw, Pakes, and Putnam 
(1998) on patent renewals, and Greenhalgh 
and Rogers (2007a) on the valuation of IP. 
Second, we have ignored the growing litera-
ture on university patenting and its implica-
tions for the open diffusion of knowledge, 
which is a separate and important topic that 
deserves its own survey. Mowery et al. (2004) 
provides a useful overview of the U.S. Bayh–
Dole Act and its impact. 
The structure of this paper is the following. 
Section 2 discusses the empirical evidence 
on the topic that is available from firm-level 
surveys. Section 3 reviews the theoretical lit-
erature on the choice between patents and 
secrecy and section 4 summarizes the main 
results from empirical analysis, while section 
5 briefly reviews implications for welfare 
analysis. Some conclusions are drawn in sec-
tion 6.
2. Survey Evidence on the Choice of  
IP Protection Methods
Because there are a several ways in which 
a firm can protect its IP and secure returns 
to its innovative activity that do not require 
formal registration, gaining even a partial 
understanding of the IP choice requires ask-
ing firms about the methods they use. This 
method has been employed in an increasing 
number of countries since the 1980s and we 
now have survey evidence from many coun-
tries that sheds light on the choice between 
formal and informal IP protection tools. 
This section reviews the available survey 
evidence on the choices companies make 
between formal IP and alternative protec-
tion mechanisms. While the theoretical 
literature—which is reviewed in section 3—
largely focuses on the patent–secrecy trade-
off, the surveys cover a much wider range of 
available appropriation mechanisms. In fact, 
an important finding from the survey-based 
evidence is that companies consider some 
of these other appropriation mechanisms, 
notably lead time, to be more important than 
patents and secrecy. Table 3 summarizes the 
main findings from the surveys.
2.1 (National) Innovation Surveys
The seminal studies in this area are 
those by Levin et al. (1987)—the so-called 
Yale I survey—and Cohen, Nelson, and 
Walsh (2000)—the Carnegie Mellon sur-
vey. Neither of these works attempted to 
directly test the empirical implications 
from economic theory, but both surveys 
were concerned with the extent to which 
firms in different industries chose legal and 
nonlegal methods to secure returns from 
their inventions. The descriptive findings 
are broadly consistent across the two stud-
ies. On average, patents are not the most 
important mechanism of IP appropriation, 
while secrecy and lead time are, regardless 
of whether product or process innovations 
are concerned. However, this is not entirely 
true for product innovations and for indus-
tries that are specialized in the production of 
“discrete” products like pharmaceuticals and 
other chemicals where patents are still the 
favorite tool to secure the returns to IP. The 
survey data reveal several explanations why 
patents are considered more effective for 
product than process innovations. Processes 
may not be patentable; if patentable, they 
are more likely to disclose too much infor-
mation to competitors and they are seen to 
be easy to invent around.
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At roughly the same time as the Yale I 
survey (1981–83), Mansfield (1986) sur-
veyed about one hundred U.S. manufactur-
ing firms, asking them to what extent patent 
protection was essential for the commercial 
introduction of their inventions. Mansfield 
asked specifically for the share of innova-
tions that would not have been developed 
or commercially introduced if patent protec-
tion had not been available. These counter-
factual questions on the effect of patents at 
the invention level are unique to Mansfield’s 
survey. He found that in two industries, 
pharmaceuticals and chemicals, patent pro-
tection was essential for 30 percent or more 
of the inventions. In another three indus-
tries (petroleum, machinery, and fabricated 
metals), patent protection was essential for 
about 10–20 percent of the inventions. The 
remaining seven industries (electrical equip-
ment, office equipment, motor vehicles, 
instruments, primary metals, rubber, and 
textiles) showed no reliance on patents. He 
also found that, in the five industries where 
patents were relatively important, 84 per-
cent of patentable inventions were patented, 
whereas the share fell to 66 percent in the 
industries where patents were not impor-
tant. His results seem consistent with those 
of the Yale I survey.
One of the first studies to follow up on 
the Yale study outside of the United States 
was that by Harabi (1995) for Switzerland 
in 1988. Using the same format as the Yale 
I survey, he confirmed that Swiss firms also 
ranked patents very low as a means of appro-
priating the returns to innovation, except in 
the chemicals (including pharmaceuticals) 
sector and some parts of the machinery sec-
tor. As in the Yale I study, the Swiss firms 
expressed concern that patents revealed too 
much information and that it was too easy 
for firms to invent around them. However, 
they were viewed by some firms as useful for 
obtaining licensing income. As in the Yale I 
survey, lead time was considered to be the 
most effective appropriation mechanism. 
Secrecy was seen as the second most effec-
tive appropriation mechanism—although 
secrecy was rated as more effective for pro-
cess than product innovations. 
CIS, which began in 1992 with seven 
European countries, included a range of 
questions on the mechanisms available to 
companies to appropriate returns to innovat-
ing.12 The wording of a typical question on 
one of these surveys is as follows:13 
For the past three years, please indicate the 
importance to your enterprise of each of the 
following methods to protect innovations: pat-
ents, registration of designs, trademarks, copy-
right, etc. 
[The respondent is asked to specify one of 
none, low, medium, or high.]
Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999) use 
the first round of the CIS, which covers 
the period 1990–92, for the Netherlands 
to study manufacturing firms’ preferences 
over the different appropriability mech-
anisms. The CIS data confirm the results 
from the Yale I and Swiss surveys: around 
half of innovating companies consider pat-
ents insignificant as protection against imita-
tors. Lead time, keeping qualified people in 
the firm, and secrecy (especially for process 
innovations) are ranked considerably higher 
than patents. The CIS data also reveal large 
differences in the importance of patents 
across industries. Patents are considered 
to be important in chemicals and pharma-
ceuticals, whereas over 90 percent of firms 
in basic metals regard patents as unimpor-
tant. Arundel (2001) confirms these results 
for the first CIS survey using data for all 
seven countries (Germany, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, 
12 There was an earlier innovation survey in France dur-
ing the late 1980s that was a precursor of the CIS. 
13 This wording is from the CIS3 and CIS4 in the United 
Kingdom. Obviously, in other countries, the question is 
asked in the appropriate language and may therefore vary 
slightly from survey to survey.
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and Norway). The results show that firms 
systematically regard lead time and secrecy 
as more important ways to protect their IP 
than patents. Over 50 percent of firms rank 
lead time as the most important mechanism 
to appropriate returns to their innovation 
and nearly 17 percent regard secrecy as the 
most important way to protect an innovation. 
In contrast, only about 10 percent regard 
patents as the most effective way to secure 
returns and only about 3 percent consider 
registered designs as the most important way 
to exploit an innovation. The relative greater 
importance of secrecy applies to firms across 
different size categories, although smaller 
firms regard secrecy as even more important 
than larger companies. 
While these studies are informative about 
the importance and effectiveness attributed 
by firms to the different mechanisms, there 
are no data on firms’ actual patenting activi-
ties. Hall et al. (2013) combine three rounds 
of CIS data for the UK (1998–2006) with 
firms’ actual patent filings to show that only a 
small share (4 percent) of innovative compa-
nies in the United Kingdom patents. Again, 
companies rate lead time, confidentiality 
agreements and secrecy higher than patents 
as mechanisms to protect their innovations. 
Hardly surprisingly, patenting companies 
regard patents as much more effective a 
mechanism to protect innovations than firms 
that do not patent. However, there is hardly 
any difference between companies that pat-
ent and those that do not with regard to how 
important secrecy or lead time is rated by 
companies. The results also show that the 
decision to patent by innovative companies 
is largely explained by a few factors: the type 
of activity carried out by a firm (industry), 
size, and the type of innovation companies 
produce (product innovations that are new 
to the market).
In the United States, there is no equiva-
lent to the European CIS. But the National 
Science Foundation and the U.S. Census 
Bureau launched the BRDIS in 2009. The 
survey collects data on firms’ R&D spending 
and innovative as well as patenting activities 
and is thus a lot broader than the Survey of 
Industrial Research and Development that 
it replaced. The survey has a number of 
advantages over the CIS: it collects data on 
global activities of companies operating in 
the United States, it asks for R&D employee 
headcounts by occupation category, and it 
separates sales and R&D data by business 
activity. So far only a few results have been 
released. The survey reveals that in 2008, 
21 percent of R&D performing companies 
applied for a patent (U.S. National Science 
Foundation 2012). Shares vary widely across 
industries: more than 60 percent of com-
panies patented in basic chemicals whereas 
less than 10 percent patented in food. In any 
case, these figures are significantly higher 
than the figures found by Hall et al. (2013) 
for the United Kingdom.14
There is also growing survey evidence from 
countries other than the United States or 
Europe.15 Hanel (2008) for example reports 
results from a 1999 survey of Canadian 
manufacturing firms. The results are very 
similar to those for U.S. and European 
firms. Companies consistently regard alter-
native mechanisms, especially confidenti-
ality agreements, as more important than 
patents. Interestingly firms also rate trade-
marks higher than patents. As in the U.S. 
and European surveys, patents are never-
theless important in discrete technologies, 
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and plastics. 
14 Hall et al. (2013) use a broader definition of R&D, 
which means the sample contains a broader range of 
companies. The companies in the U.S. sample may also 
take into consideration patent filings by foreign affiliates. 
Moreover, the difference may also be partly due to under-
counting of patents by Hall et al. (2013) on the one hand 
(because patents have to be matched by name to compa-
nies) and overreporting by companies in the U.S. survey.
15 Innovation surveys following the CIS model are 
conducted in a wide range of countries, including middle 
income economies, for example Brazil’s PINTEC survey.
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The survey also suggests that innovators of 
“new-to-the-world” innovations rely more on 
patents than secrecy. This is expected, given 
the novelty requirement for patenting, but it 
also suggests a positive correlation between 
the value of innovations and the propensity 
to patent them.
So far we focused in the discussion on 
firms’ assessment of the importance of the 
different appropriation mechanisms for pro-
tecting innovations. Some of the surveys also 
offer information on motives for firms’ pat-
enting decisions. Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 
(2000) find that firms in the United States 
use patenting for strategic reasons, rather 
than for protecting their IP. Respondents 
reported that they used patenting to block 
competitors, to improve goodwill reputation 
and to improve bargaining power in the mar-
ket. A similar type of analysis conducted on 
a sample of patenting firms confirms these 
findings for Germany (Blind et al. 2006). 
Although most German firms indicate that 
they use patents primarily to protect their 
innovations from imitation and help secure 
freedom to operate, firms also use patents 
for offensive blocking of competitors (stra-
tegic patenting) and to improve the com-
pany’s image.16 Jung and Walsh (2010) also 
focus on patenting companies to learn about 
their motives for patenting. Their survey, the 
Georgia Tech Inventor Survey, asks a sample 
of U.S.-based inventors listed on triadic (filed 
with the USPTO, European Patent Office, 
and Japan Patent Office) patents for their 
motives to patent. The results confirm the 
findings by Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000) 
and Blind et al. (2006): a substantial share of 
inventors lists offensive and defensive block-
ing as an important  motivation for patenting. 
16 The German car manufacturer Audi provides an 
example for how a company’s image can be influenced by 
its patent filings. When launching a new car model in 2006, 
the company launched a multimillion dollar advertising 
campaign stating, “To date, NASA has filed 6,509 patents. 
In developing the A6, Audi filed 9,621.”
Offensive blocking, which includes the use of 
patent fences, is found to be more common 
in discrete technologies, such as pharma-
ceuticals. Jung and Walsh also ask inventors 
for reasons why patented inventions are not 
used by companies, where use is defined in 
three ways: (1) companies exploit the pat-
ented invention themselves; (2) they license 
it out; or (3) they use it in a spin-out com-
pany. The most commonly cited reasons for 
nonuse are that no commercial use has been 
found yet, that the patent is used passively 
to block competitors and prevent inventing 
around, or that the invention was subject to 
market or technological obsolescence.
Some of the surveys discussed above also 
explore potential differences in the use of 
appropriation mechanisms between small 
and large firms. It is easy to see from sum-
mary table 3 that the choice of sampling 
frame affects the frequency with which the 
firms in the sample use any kind of IP pro-
tection method. For example, compare the 
share of firms that rate patents or secrecy of 
high importance in the Arundel (2001) or 
Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999) sample, 
which covers a wide size range to the share 
in the Arundel, van de Paal, and Soete (1995) 
report, which is restricted to large R&D-
doing firms. In contrast, lead time (being 
first to market) is rated relatively highly in 
all samples. 
The 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey con-
ducted by the Berkeley Center for Law and 
Technology specifically targeted small, new 
companies in the United States (Graham 
et al. 2009). Graham et al. (2009) and 
Sichelman and Graham (2010) summarize 
the evidence from the information obtained 
on around 1,300 high-tech (biotech and soft-
ware) start-ups founded in the United States 
since 1998. They note important differences 
in patenting behavior and the way in which 
patents are used across industries. While for 
some industries such as biotech, patenting 
is a vital part of corporate strategy, firms in 
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other sectors, notably software, essentially 
avoid the patent system altogether. They 
also point out that strategic motives to pat-
ent as described previously are important 
for start-ups, contrasting the commonly held 
view that strategic patenting is only practiced 
by large enterprises: indeed start-ups value 
the reputation effect that patent ownership 
may bring about. Despite the importance 
of patents reported by biotech and medical 
device companies, companies still report 
that patents provide hardly any incentives 
for R&D. The survey also asks firms directly 
why they choose not to patent, and it turns 
out that the most significant barrier to pat-
enting (across the two industries) is financial. 
However, biotech firms rate concerns about 
the disclosure of information contained in a 
patent publication as a greater obstacle than 
costs, while the opposite is true for software. 
To some extent, this difference reflects the 
differing use of the system by firms in the 
two areas: biotechs worry about disclosure 
because they do patent (in spite of the cost), 
whereas software firms worry more about 
cost because they don’t. Software compa-
nies also indicate that patents are of little 
use for them because enforcement would be 
prohibitively costly and inventing around is 
relatively easy, making patents ineffective. 
Instead, software companies consider lead 
time as the most important way to appropri-
ate returns to innovating. 
Whereas Graham et al. (2009) focus on 
start-up companies, Hyytinen and Pajarinen 
(2003, 2005) and Leiponen and Byma (2009) 
collect data on a wider set of small compa-
nies. In their survey of small Finnish com-
panies, there is a distinction between firms’ 
rating of the effectiveness of the different 
appropriability mechanisms and their actual 
use by companies. 25 percent of the small 
companies in the sample report that patents 
are the most important appropriability mech-
anism, while only 15 percent report secrecy 
to be the most important  mechanism. This 
contrasts with the information on the actual 
use of these mechanisms. 62 percent of com-
panies indicate that they rely on secrecy and 
only 16 percent report that they patent. This 
disagrees with Mansfield’s findings for the 
United States, where he found that compa-
nies that indicated that patents played no 
important role were still found to patent 
the overwhelming share of their patent-
able inventions. The difference is probably 
explained by the fact that Mansfield con-
tacted mainly large, established firms. 
One important factor that needs to be con-
sidered in evaluating the results of these sur-
veys is the position held by the respondent, 
especially in large firms, where there is con-
siderable differentiation in areas of respon-
sibility. Many of the surveys of R&D-doing 
firms are directed to the R&D manager, as 
in the case of Levin et al. (1987); the CIS 
questionnaires do not specify who should fill 
them out. In contrast to the majority of the 
surveys, Cockburn and Henderson (2003) 
survey senior IP in-house counsels across a 
range of industries in the United States. The 
data collected from IP counsels suggest that 
the availability of patents has an important 
positive effect on R&D spending. IP coun-
sels do not think that patents reveal too 
much valuable information to competitors. 
Moreover, patents are seen as important 
instruments to settle IP disputes and avoid 
litigation. Half of all the respondents to this 
survey identify patents as the company’s most 
valuable IP asset, and trade secrets are only 
seen by 12 percent of respondents as a com-
pany’s most valuable IP asset. Thus, we can 
safely conclude that the legal departments of 
firms generally rate patents more highly than 
either firm CEOs or R&D managers. 
The fact that survey evidence results 
depend on the choice of respondent tells us 
that we should be cautious in assigning too 
much numerical credibility to the shares 
that result. In particular it may be somewhat 
misleading to compare across surveys unless 
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the questions and the types of respondents 
are identical. Nevertheless, without these 
surveys we would perhaps not have learned 
the extent to which firms rely on informal 
methods like lead time, secrecy, product 
complexity, and sales and service activity to 
secure returns to their innovative activities, 
as opposed to formal methods like patents 
and trademarks. 
2.2 Cross-Country Comparisons
Most empirical studies have been con-
ducted on survey data for a single country; 
while this allows researchers to identify the 
firms’ and industry characteristics that can 
explain firms’ preference for secrecy (or for 
patents), single country studies do not allow 
the identification of the characteristics of 
the patent legislation that can influence this 
preference. For instance, in countries where 
the procedure to apply for a patent is very 
cumbersome, some firms may find the whole 
process so expensive that they prefer to opt 
for secrecy to protect their IP (see, for exam-
ple, Moser (2012) for a historical compari-
son between Britain and the United States). 
Some researchers have used cross-country 
data (or international data surveys) to under-
stand how the national patent legislation 
can affect the choice between patents and 
secrecy. We focus here on the PACE sur-
vey developed by Arundel et al. in 1995 and 
on the surveys of Japanese and U.S. firms 
(Pitkethly 2001; Cohen et al. 2002).
The PACE survey was directed to the 
European Union’s 840 largest manufactur-
ing and industrial firms located in Germany, 
the United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Denmark, and France. 
The findings of the PACE report confirm 
important industry variations regarding 
the effectiveness of IP protection tools for 
European firms. As in the case of Levin et 
al. (1987) and Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 
(2000) for the United States, patents play 
an outstanding role in the pharmaceutical 
and chemical industry for both product and 
process inventions. Secrecy is important in 
protecting process inventions in most indus-
tries. Arundel, van de Paal, and Soete (1995) 
suggest that differences in IP legislation and 
enforcement can explain why European 
firms tend to use a different mix of IP tools 
than U.S. firms. Arundel and Kabla (1998) 
combine the PACE survey data with data on 
French firms collected by the French Office 
of Industrial Studies and Statistics (SESSI). 
The data are used to investigate differences 
in patent propensities across industries. As 
expected, patenting propensities are higher 
for product innovators (36 percent) than 
process innovators (25 percent). The sectors 
with the highest patenting propensities are 
pharmaceuticals and precision instruments; 
the lowest patenting propensities are found 
in textiles, regardless of product or process 
innovators. The surveys also reveal that firms 
are more likely to rely on patent protection 
if they export to the United States or Japan.
Cohen et al. (2002) compare results from 
a survey among 593 Japanese and 826 U.S. 
firms regarding the importance of patents as 
appropriation mechanisms. It emerges that 
slightly more respondents in Japan rated pat-
ents as an effective means to protecting inno-
vations than in the United States (38 percent 
and 36 percent, respectively, for product 
and 25 percent and 24 percent, respectively, 
for process innovations). The more striking 
result is that secrecy is regarded as a much 
less effective way to protect innovations in 
Japan than in the United States (26 percent 
and 51 percent, respectively, for product and 
29 percent and 53 percent, respectively, for 
process innovations). Hence, while in the 
United States, other appropriation mecha-
nisms, above all secrecy and lead time, are 
regarded as the most effective ways of pro-
tecting innovations, in Japan, patents are 
equally important as any of the other mecha-
nisms. The authors explain these differences 
in the importance of patents in Japan and 
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the United States by institutional differ-
ences in the countries’ patent systems. For 
instance, at the time of the survey, patent 
laws allowed innovators to apply for a patent 
early in the innovation process in Japan due 
to a first-to-file rule of priority (as opposed 
to the U.S. first-to-invent rule of priority). 
Also, Japanese patents were subject to “pre-
grant opposition” while no analogous oppo-
sition process existed in the United States. 
These differences implied that Japanese 
firms rated patents as a stronger tool to pro-
tect their IP. Pitkethly’s (2001) survey of 
patenting Japanese and UK companies also 
suggests that Japanese companies consider 
patents as more important a source of tech-
nical information than UK companies.17 A 
similar result is seen by Cohen et al. (2002), 
who find that Japanese firms are much more 
likely to see patents as information sources 
contributing to the completion of innovation 
projects and to view patents as an important 
source of information.
These differences obtained from cross-
country comparisons are interesting. 
However, the comparison of relatively similar 
IP systems (especially within the European 
Union) limits the degree to which such dif-
ferences can explain observed differences 
in the choice between formal and informal 
appropriation mechanisms. 
3. Theory
In this section, we review theoretical argu-
ments that suggest why and how firms choose 
between formal and informal IP protection. 
We concentrate our discussion on patents and 
secrecy, as these are the main types of formal 
and informal IP considered in the theoretical 
literature. It is also true that, in principle, the 
choice between patents and secrecy involves 
17 Pitkethly surveyed in 1994 a nonrandom sample of 
211 Japanese and 259 UK companies that have applied for 
patents. The survey focuses on IP management practices.
an explicit and fairly stark trade-off between 
disclosure and nondisclosure of an inventive 
idea. In contrast, consider the traditional 
use of IP in form of copyright for protection 
of software by protecting its expression in 
bits and bytes. This use is commonly com-
bined with the use of trade secrecy for the 
code that exists in a form comprehensible 
by humans so that, in principle, no trade-off 
between copyright and secrecy exists. That 
is, a software program can be both published 
in machine form under copyright and pro-
tected (at least barring considerable effort 
in reverse engineering) by secrecy.18 The 
same considerations apply to such informal 
instruments as lead time and complexity—in 
principle, these can easily be combined with 
any of the formal mechanisms, so there is no 
real need to choose. However, in principle, 
full secrecy rules out the use of the patent 
instrument for protecting IP, which is why 
there is a focus on this choice in the theoreti-
cal literature.
Table 4 shows schematically the four 
options available to a firm faced with the 
decision of whether to patent or maintain 
an invention secret. Of course, this assumes 
that firms have a choice. If, for example, the 
invention does not represent patentable sub-
ject matter, the option of obtaining patent 
protection does not arise. Importantly, the 
table refers to inventions as the unit of obser-
vation, not products. Products often embody 
a number of inventions, which can be pro-
tected by different mechanisms (see section 
4 for more discussion). Table 4 also shows 
that, apart from either patenting or secrecy 
in the lower-left and upper-right quadrants, 
respectively, firms may in fact combine 
secrecy and patenting to protect a given 
invention (upper-left quadrant) or discard 
both options (lower-right quadrant). In what 
18 The legal situation with respect to reverse engineer-
ing of software code is somewhat complex and evolving. See 
Samuelson and Scotchmer (2002) for a fuller discussion. 
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follows, we discuss each of these options in 
turn, although we focus on the choice on the 
off-diagonals because that is the most widely 
modeled.
3.1 Patent and Secrecy as Substitutes
Much of the theoretical literature regards 
a firm’s choice between patents and secrecy 
as mutually exclusive (Friedman, Landes, 
and Posner 1991). The choice is explained by 
the inherent trade-off between the benefits 
from using patents and its costs, relative to 
relying on secrecy. Benefits and costs are not 
only a function of the invention that qualifies 
for patent protection, but also of defensive or 
offensive strategic considerations taking into 
account a firm’s competitors’ behavior. This 
is hardly surprising in light of the nature of 
IP, i.e., its value lies in affecting third par-
ties’ behavior rather than directly affecting a 
firm’s own inputs into production.19
There are differences in the legal protec-
tion conferred by patents and secrecy. First, 
patents are granted only on patent eligible 
subject matter. The definition differs across 
jurisdictions. For example, the EPO does 
not consider computer enabled inventions 
(software) per se as patent-eligible subject 
matter whereas the USPTO does. Hence, 
secrecy is applicable to a much broader 
19 A firm’s own freedom to operate is ensured by block-
ing third parties from claiming property rights on a specific 
invention.
range of inventions than patents, as there is 
no formal subject restriction.20 Patentability 
requires an invention to satisfy the novelty 
and inventive step thresholds, whereas there 
is no such requirement for secrecy (even 
when nondisclosure agreements are used).21 
This implies that secrecy can protect work 
in progress, whereas only inventions that 
have reached a certain stage of development 
can be patented, as they need to meet these 
statutory requirements for patentability. 
Second, if granted, a patent offers 20 years 
of statutory protection. Secrecy, in contrast, 
can potentially protect the invention indefi-
nitely. However, an invention that is being 
kept secret may legally be appropriated by 
a firm that has independently discovered or 
20 Secrecy usually protects commercial information, 
financial data (e.g., pricing and costing data), business 
methods, business strategies, business plans, customer/sup-
plier lists, technical designs, drawings, blueprints, maps, 
negative information (i.e., things that have been tried but 
did not work), prototypes, formulae, and recipes—for 
which patent protection would normally not be available.
21 According to Article 39 TRIPS, any “undisclosed 
information” is protected by secrecy if secrecy is main-
tained through “reasonable efforts,” although the effective 
protection of trade secrecy varies substantially by jurisdic-
tion. Some jurisdictions may impose additional require-
ments such as that the information be nontrivial. Contrary 
to patents, trade secrecy protection does not require an 
inventive step. It suffices that the undisclosed information 
has economic value, i.e., a third party would benefit eco-
nomically if it gained access to the information. Depending 
on the jurisdiction, trade secrecy may also be protected by 
unfair competition law, tort law, criminal law, as well as 
breach of confidence and contractual obligations.
TABLE 4 
Patenting versus Secrecy
Patent Don’t patent
Secrecy Patent–secrecy combination Secrecy only
Nonsecrecy Patent only Disclosure–publishing
Source: Graham (2004).
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reverse engineered it, whereas the same is 
not true of a patented invention.22
Some technologies are easier to protect 
with a patent and, once granted, a patent 
is easier to enforce because the technology 
is inherently easier to describe and delimit. 
This factor may affect the willingness of 
firms to use the patent system. The lead-
ing example of the importance of this is the 
chemicals sector, including pharmaceuticals, 
where patents protect a specific compound 
that can be described in a precise chemi-
cal formula. This leads to fewer (although 
not zero) disputes over the exact breadth of 
the patent and easier notice, in the property 
rights sense (Bessen and Meurer 2008). The 
contrast with the information technology 
sector, where the precise breadth of patent 
is often unclear, is striking, and is one of the 
reasons that patents in that sector are gener-
ally not used primarily for appropriating the 
returns to innovation.  
Applying for a patent requires direct and 
indirect financial expenditures. If a patent 
is granted, it protects an invention only in 
the jurisdiction in which it was granted. The 
published patent is visible, however, outside 
of jurisdictions where the patent is in force. 
Thus, the invention could be legally imitated 
and used in jurisdictions where the patent is 
not in force. Moreover, to keep the patent in 
force, maintenance fees have to be paid to 
each patent office that has validated the pat-
ent. However, secrecy is also costly because 
often it is vital that confidentiality agree-
ments are used and the knowledge of the 
invention is guarded. Keeping  innovations 
22 The situation is slightly more complicated under 
a first-to-invent priority system such as prevailed in the 
United States until 2012. In this case, the firm holding 
an invention secret could, in principle, file for a patent if 
another firm filed for a patent on the same invention, pro-
vided it could be shown that the later-filing firm invented 
it first. An “interference” proceeding at the patent office 
might be the outcome and there is no guarantee that the 
first firm would win, given the difficulty of establishing 
priority.
secret  usually requires considerable effort 
and active knowledge management in the 
form of an internal secrecy policy, which 
may be costly to implement and maintain. 
For example, firms may rely on the splitting 
of R&D into different components across 
researchers and research labs such that indi-
vidual pieces of R&D do not allow a com-
plete understanding and functioning of a 
given technology.23 
Both patents and secrecy are expensive 
to enforce. In the case of patents, enforce-
ment requires active monitoring of poten-
tial infringement and the financial resources 
to engage in litigation.24 Enforcement of 
secrecy will also be costly and may be dif-
ficult to achieve in court.25 The legal pro-
tection of secrecy is also narrower as only 
23 Zhao (2006) provides empirical evidence that multi-
national firms tend to split knowledge more if part of the 
research is executed in countries with weak IP rights pro-
tection. A rather low-tech product also illustrates this point: 
Thomas’s English Muffins. A recent U.S. court case sug-
gests that Thomas’s splits the recipe of its English Muffins, 
which is a trade secret, into separate components, such 
as the basic recipe, the moisture level of the mixture, and 
the baking process. Reportedly, only seven key employ-
ees know all steps required to make the muffins, while all 
other employees only have knowledge about their specific 
assigned task in the manufacturing process. This case also 
serves to illustrate the threat to secrecy that emerges from 
the movement of personnel, as the court case was triggered 
by concerns that one of the seven “informed” employees 
might reveal his knowledge after having accepted a job 
with the competitor. See New York Times, August 6, 2010.
24 For example in case of the UK, total costs for the 
plaintiff and defendant of a court action in a patent case 
are typically between £1 and £6 million (Helmers and 
McDonagh 2012).
25 Data on court cases alleging the misappropriation of 
trade secrets show that in the overwhelming share of cases 
(former) employees and business partners are accused of 
misappropriation (Almeling et al. 2010, 2011). This may 
indicate that proving misappropriation of trade secrets by 
third parties in court, including misappropriation by com-
petitors, may be very difficult. Moreover, the owner of a 
trade secret may have little incentive to pursue a case in 
court if this could lead to more confidential information 
being revealed during court proceedings. As Neil Wilkoff 
put it in a recent IPKat blogpost (April 2, 2013), “Whatever 
the amount of any court judgment for breach, the trade 
secret smoke is out of the bottle and not even Aladdin will 
be able to retrieve it.”
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misappropriation of the invention can be 
claimed in court. The value of a patent or 
secrecy depends on the financial capability 
of the owner to undertake legal action in case 
of infringement or breach of confidentiality 
is detected and the likelihood of success of 
the court case. We summarize these consid-
erations in table 5.
Second, there is uncertainty involved in 
the use of both patents and secrecy. With 
regard to patents, there are three instances 
where outcomes are uncertain: whether a 
patent is granted, whether the patent is inval-
idated postgrant (either by the patent office 
or a civil court), and whether infringement 
can be proven—that is, whether it can be 
shown that an infringing action falls within 
the valid claims of a patent. In the case of 
secrecy, the uncertainty concerns mostly 
whether the invention can be maintained 
as secret, although the question of whether, 
for example, breach of confidentiality can be 
enforced may be also relevant.
The theoretical literature discussed 
below takes these factors as given and, 
instead, focuses on specific elements of the 
 patent–secrecy trade-off. In the following 
subsections, we discuss theoretical models of 
the patent–secrecy choice, classifying them 
into models that focus on disclosure, com-
petition for innovation, lead time, and com-
plexity, and the consequences of sequential 
or cumulative innovation. 
3.1.1. Disclosure
In principle, once an inventor decides to 
disclose an invention, he forfeits the option 
to protect the invention through secrecy. 
Moreover, the information disclosed in a 
patent may be only imperfectly protected by 
the patent simply because infringement has 
to be detected and enforced through litiga-
tion, which may have an uncertain outcome. 
This suggests that disclosure required by a 
patent may have an important effect on an 
inventor’s decision to patent or maintain an 
invention secret. Horstmann, MacDonald, 
and Slivinski (1985) show that an innova-
tor’s propensity to patent falls if patents 
reveal information to competitors. The 
model by Horstmann et al., however, does 
not allow firms to strategically choose the 
TABLE 5 
Factors Affecting the Patent–Secrecy Choice
Patents Secrecy
Disclosure (codifiable knowledge) Yes No
Disclosure (tacit knowledge) No No
Ease of delimiting invention Yes Not clear
Reverse engineering allowed in general No Yes
Subject matter Statutory Broader
Timing After invention Work-in-progress
Process versus product Both Easier for process
Length Twenty years Longer (potentially)
Cost to obtain Higher Nonzero
Enforcement cost Expensive Expensive
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amount  disclosed through a patent. The 
seminal model by Anton and Yao (2004)—
henceforth, AY—in contrast, looks directly 
at the role of disclosure in a firm’s decision 
to patent. In the model, disclosure has two 
effects: on the one hand, it helps competi-
tors innovate and on the other, it can be used 
strategically to transmit information on the 
innovator’s competitive edge to a laggard 
competitor. We sketch the AY model below, 
using a general downward-sloping demand 
function rather than the linear demand func-
tion used by AY. 
The AY model is a three-stage signaling 
game with two risk-neutral firms—the inno-
vator, i, and the competitor, j. In the first 
stage (“protection and disclosure stage”), 
the innovator invests in R&D; the outcome 
is a process innovation allowing the innova-
tor to produce at marginal cost, c. The out-
come of the investment in R&D is uncertain: 
in case of failure, the firm uses the existing 
technology and produces at a marginal cost _ c > c. The R&D outcome is observed by the 
innovator but not by the competitor.26 The 
innovator has to decide how to protect his 
innovation. He has two options: he can either 
use a patent (P) or can keep the innovation 
secret (S). Regardless of whether the innova-
tor chooses P or S, information on the process 
innovation leaks, which allows the imitator 
to replicate the process innovation and pro-
duce at marginal cost s (where s ≥ c). That 
is, AY assume that disclosure under patenting 
is the same as under secrecy, with the only 
difference being that the imitator is liable to 
damages if he is found to infringe the patent. 
This is a fairly innocuous assumption, whose 
relaxation would complicate the model with-
out adding much insight. In the second stage 
(“infringement-risking imitation stage”), hav-
ing observed the choice of the innovator of 
the previous stage, the competitor (who does 
26 Encaoua and Lefouili (2005) obtain results similar to 
AY in a full information set-up.
not invest in R&D) has to choose whether to 
imitate and risk infringement (if the innova-
tor has chosen P) or use the existing technol-
ogy. In the third stage (“competition stage”), 
the two firms compete as Cournot.
Competition stage. There are three dif-
ferent types of competition regimes, depend-
ing on the choices of the innovator and of 
the competitor in the previous stages of the 
game. If the innovator has decided to rely 
on secrecy, the competitor can imitate the 
innovation at no cost and produce at mar-
ginal cost s. In this case, the market reduces 
to pure Cournot competition. If the innova-
tor has obtained a patent, the competitor can 
imitate and risk infringement or stick with 
the existing technology. If he uses the exist-
ing technology, his marginal cost is  
_ c . Firms 
compete under Cournot, although the imita-
tor now faces a larger marginal cost,  
_ c > s. If 
the imitator decides to imitate the patented 
invention, his marginal cost is s, but he is 
exposed to the risk of being caught infring-
ing the patent. In the model, the imitator is 
found to infringe the patent with probability 
γ. If infringement is found, the imitator has 
to pay the innovator damages. In the model, 
these are modeled as royalties on the reve-
nues: τ pq j where τ is the royalty rate. Hence, γ τ = g defines the expected infringement 
damages rate. AY interpret this as an indi-
cator of the strength of the property rights 
available to the innovator. If g = 1, then the 
innovator has full property rights; if g = 0, he 
has no property rights in the invention. 
Two of the three competition regimes 
are straight Cournot, with costs (c, s) or 
(c,  
_ c ). Therefore, we focus on the third case, 
where there is a patent and the imitator 
risks infringement. In this case, the profits 
for the imitator, j, are equal to the differ-
ence between total revenues and total pro-
duction costs net of expected infringement 
damages:
(1)  π j = ( p − s) qj − g pqj.
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The profits for the innovator i can be 
expressed as the difference between the total 
revenues and total costs plus the expected 
damages from the infringement of the 
patent:
(2) π i = ( p − c) qi + gpqj.
We assume a monotonic demand function 
p = F(Q) = F(qi + qj) with F′ < 0. From 
this we compute best response functions for 
the innovator and the imitator, and solve for 
the equilibrium output choices as a function 
of the degree of disclosure and the strength 
of property rights. 
(3)  q j * =  1 _ −F′( Q * ) [ F( Q * ) −  s _ 1 − g ] 
  q i * =  1 _ −F′( Q * ) [ F( Q * ) − c ] − g q j * 
 =  1 _ −F′( Q * )  [ (1 − g)F( Q * ) − c +  gs _ (1 − g) ] 
With some tedious manipulation, we can 
use equation (3) to show that the weaker 
property rights protection is (lower g), the 
more the imitator produces and, conversely, 
as g increases.27 One can also show that as s 
increases relative to c (less disclosure), the 
ratio of the innovator output to imitator out-
put grows. In passing, note that j will not 
produce unless the market price covers his 
marginal cost and the royalties he has to pay 
[ p * (1 − g) > s]. 
27 There are some auxiliary conditions: F′ has to be suf-
ficiently small and positive (or zero, as in the case of lin-
ear demand), and it has to be profitable for the imitator 
to produce. 
The expected profits in equilibrium are:
(4)  π j =  1 _ −F′( Q * ) 
 ×  [ (1 − g)  p * 2 +   s 2  _ 1 − g − 2s p * ]   π i =  1 _ −F′( Q * ) 
×  [   p * 2 + gc p * + c ( c −   gs _ 1 − g ) − 2c p * ] 
Assuming a linear demand function as in 
AY, one can use equation (4) to show the 
trade-off the innovator faces when choos-
ing the optimal degree of disclosure. On the 
one hand, disclosing too much information 
(lower s) reduces profits, as the imitator can 
now more easily replicate the process inno-
vation. On the other, the profits of the inno-
vator increase (and those of the imitator fall) 
if the imitator infers that the innovator has 
lower costs (smaller s). 
Infringement-risking imitation stage. 
The competitor has to choose whether to 
imitate (risking infringement) or use the 
existing technology. He can observe whether 
the process innovation has been patented 
and the degree of disclosure. He cannot 
observe the marginal cost of the innova-
tor and, therefore, is not fully aware of the 
extent of the competitive advantage con-
ferred by the innovation. If the innovator 
has not patented, the imitator can use the 
disclosed knowledge and produce at cost s 
without infringement risk. If the innovator 
has patented, the imitator has two alterna-
tives: he can imitate and risk infringement or 
use the existing technology.
Suppose the innovator chooses to patent 
and discloses s. If the competitor does not 
imitate, he faces a cost disadvantage of  
_ c ver-
sus c, and profits equal to −(pN −  _ c )2/F′( Q N ), 
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where N denotes the price and quantity with 
no imitation. If he decides to imitate, the 
cost disadvantage is s versus c, but there is 
the risk of having to pay damages. Using 
equation (4), the expected payoffs for the 
competitor under the different scenarios are: 
(5)  
(  p N − c ) 2  _
F′( Q N )  ><  (1 − g)( p I − s/(1 − g) ) 2   __ F′( Q I )  
The equality in equation (5) identifies an 
equal payoff line (EPL) in the (i, j) marginal 
cost space along which the expected payoffs 
are the same and, therefore, the competitor 
is indifferent between imitating and nonimi-
tating. Above this line, (where s is closer to _ c , that is, disclosure is weak), the competi-
tor chooses not to imitate, while below it, he 
chooses to imitate. The intersection between 
the EPL and the line where c = s (i.e., the 
45° line) gives the cut-off level of the inferred 
costs above which the competitor has no 
incentive to imitate. In the case of linear 
demand with p = α − β Q, AY show that this 
point is given by the following expression:
(6)  c * (g, α,  _ c) =  2c + α [ (1 − g)h(g) − 1 ]    __
1 + (1 + g)h(g)  
where h ( g ) = 3/ [ ( 3 − g ) √ _ 1 − g ] . 
So the competitor will imitate when, given 
the expected damages implied by g, the cost 
disadvantage of using the new technology 
over the inferred cost of the innovator is 
smaller than the cost disadvantage of using 
the existing technology compared to the 
inferred cost of the innovator. 
Protection and disclosure stage. The 
innovator decides whether to use a patent 
or secrecy and how much to disclose. The 
equilibrium involves three distinct regions: 
1) a region where an innovator with high 
marginal costs and a small invention prefers 
to patent the invention and fully disclose 
the technical knowledge; 2) a region where 
the innovator with a medium size invention 
prefers to patent and partially disclose the 
invention; and 3) a region where the inno-
vator with a large invention chooses secrecy 
and partially discloses the knowledge. 
If the innovation is relatively small (c >  c * ), 
the cost reduction of s over c is insufficient 
to justify the risk of infringing a patent and 
therefore the competitor has no incentive 
to imitate. In this case, the innovator has a 
strong incentive to patent and to disclose 
fully to signal low cost, which has a positive 
impact on his expected profits. AY show that 
the result holds even under a weak property 
rights regime. In addition, as g → 1 (strong 
property rights), the cutoff  c * tends toward 
zero and the innovator will always patent and 
disclose fully. 
For c <  c * , the competitor finds imita-
tion attractive and, therefore, the innova-
tor no longer has an incentive to disclose 
fully. Instead, the innovator faces a trade-off 
between signaling low costs (and obtaining 
larger damage payments) and transferring 
knowledge to a competitor. In other words, 
it is worth signaling low costs through disclo-
sure and to obtain damages if the patent is 
infringed. So the innovator will now disclose 
partially.
For large innovations, however, the trade-
off to signaling via partial disclosure and 
patenting becomes less attractive. The inno-
vator has two sources of profits under imita-
tion: revenues from damages if the patent is 
infringed and profits. As the innovator’s mar-
ginal cost of production falls (i.e., the inno-
vation gets larger), the innovator faces the 
same trade-off as in the medium innovation 
region. On the one hand, the innovator may 
be induced to disclose more knowledge to 
signal low cost. On the other, lower marginal 
cost (for a given amount of disclosure) implies 
that it can produce more than its competitor. 
The competitor faces two  opposite forces as 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LII (June 2014)394
well: on the one hand, lower marginal cost 
of the innovator implies lower profits for the 
competitor. On the other, if the innovator 
discloses more, the competitor’s marginal 
costs fall. AY show that in equilibrium, a large 
innovation leads the innovator to rely more 
strongly on the cost advantage and less on 
expected damages. For g sufficiently small 
and c sufficiently large, the cost–advantage 
effect dominates. In equilibrium, giving up 
property rights signals a large innovation and 
permits less disclosure of valuable enabling 
knowledge. 
To support this counterintuitive result 
empirically, AY point to the example of the 
Ford Motor Company in 1913, after intro-
ducing the moving assembly line process. 
Ford encouraged wide disclosure of this 
innovation, which was not patent protected, 
but according to Hounshell (1984), the dis-
closure was insufficient to allow full imitation. 
The basic rationale was that Ford wanted to 
signal to competitors that it had extremely 
low production costs, in order to discourage 
them. Although an interesting example, it is 
not clear that patenting was even an option 
in this case, as the innovation was essentially 
organizational. But it does capture the moti-
vation that the AY model relies on. As we 
will see later, the general conclusions of the 
AY model are overturned if the innovator is 
threatened by a rival innovator who might 
patent first. In this example, the (partial) lack 
of patentability and the first-to-invent system 
that prevailed then would probably have dis-
couraged patenting by a rival anyway. 
Zaby (2010) arrives at the same conclu-
sion as AY, that is, important innovations are 
not patented, whereas the less important 
ones are. Zaby analyzes the patenting deci-
sion of an innovator who is aware that pat-
enting an invention involves disclosure of 
knowledge, which may enable a competitor 
to imitate its invention. The key differences 
from AY are that: a) there is no asymmetric 
information on the size of the innovation; 
b) the  innovator cannot choose the amount 
of technical knowledge to disclose with a 
patent because Zaby assumes that patenting 
is always associated with full disclosure while 
secrecy is not; and c) competition is Bertrand 
with different qualities rather than Cournot. 
In her asymmetric duopoly model, one firm is 
a successful inventor while the second firm is 
not, but may eventually develop the capabil-
ity of making a closely related invention. The 
strategic interactions between the two firms 
are modeled as a three-stage game where in 
the first stage, the innovator has to decide 
whether to patent or not. In the second stage, 
both firms choose their qualities, with firm 
two restricted to a region that is not covered 
by the patent, and in the last stage, they com-
pete in prices. While a patent may protect the 
firm’s invention, the firm may run two addi-
tional risks: first, a patent requires the full 
disclosure of the protected invention; second, 
the competitor may still enter the market with 
a noninfringing product, as the patent cannot 
cover all possible product qualities. 
Heger and Zaby (2013) use a simplified 
version of the Zaby (2010) model to look at 
the role of disclosure in determining a com-
pany’s choice between patenting and secrecy. 
The model is based on Salop’s circle model 
(Salop 1979), where firms choose a location 
in a vertically differentiated product circle. 
There is a single innovator that can choose 
to patent to broaden the product space he 
occupies. All other firms decide whether to 
enter the market, taking into account the 
innovator’s choice. All firms face some fixed 
market entry costs that decline with more 
disclosure. Hence, in this model, the innova-
tor trades off the exclusionary effect a patent 
has on competition with its disclosure effect, 
which promotes entry and hence, competi-
tion. Since this trade-off varies across com-
panies, the model implies that patenting 
propensities differ across firms because the 
disclosure and exclusion effects of a patent 
differ.
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3.1.2. Competition for Innovation
The discussion on the choice between 
secrecy and patenting has, up to now, focused 
on the interaction between a single innovator 
and one or several imitators. This excludes 
the possibility of simultaneous discovery. 
Lemley (2012) provides ample anecdotal 
evidence for the widespread occurrence of 
such simultaneous discovery, i.e., a situa-
tion in which independent researchers pro-
duce (almost) simultaneous inventions. The 
examples show that well-known, disruptive 
inventions such as the steam engine, the 
telegraph, the sewing machine, the tele-
phone, and the light bulb, were not the out-
put of individual genius, despite widely held 
beliefs. Instead, they were the outcome of 
cumulative research and experimentation 
where different inventors followed very sim-
ilar leads at the same time. In all the historic 
examples provided by Lemley, the successful 
inventor obtained a patent on the invention, 
which in most cases produced considerable 
income for the inventor. In contrast, the 
other inventors working simultaneously on 
the same or a similar invention came away 
empty-handed. Lemley (2012: 755), there-
fore, argues that “[t]he patent isn’t a carrot 
so much as a stick with which to threaten 
the slow.” That is, patents offer incentives to 
innovate not so much because they offer a 
reward in the form of a patent, but because 
patents punish those inventors that invest in 
research but fail to obtain the patent. Hence, 
in a setting with simultaneous inventions, the 
decision whether to patent or maintain an 
invention secret is dominated by the concern 
over a competitor obtaining a patent first, 
which overturns the AY result above.
Kultti, Takalo, and Toikka (2006) makes 
the fairly obvious point that when there 
is a possibility of simultaneous invention, 
even when secrecy offers stronger protec-
tion, firms will prefer to patent to prevent 
their competitors from patenting the same 
 invention. They consider a duopoly where 
firms can simultaneously develop the same 
invention and hence a patent race emerges. 
The innovator will be willing to patent to 
gain some competitive advantage if there 
is a high probability that the competitor 
develops the same invention. When there 
is a strong likelihood of simultaneous inven-
tion, patenting takes on a defensive role: 
now the choice is not between patenting and 
secrecy, but between patenting and allowing 
a competitor to patent. Since the inventor 
that obtained the patent always earns higher 
profits, there is a strong incentive to patent.28 
This type of result has similarities with the 
older patent race models where, in a “win-
ner-take-all race,” firms compete in research 
(Wright 1983; Gilbert and Newbery 1982). 
Kultti, Takalo, and Toikka’s main result that 
patenting is preferred remains true even if 
patenting per se offers slightly less chances 
of protection than secrecy. However, this 
result only holds if the protection offered by 
the patent system is above a certain thresh-
old: if the protection from patenting falls 
(say due to weak enforcement), then at some 
point secrecy will be preferred. 
The main argument of the paper is given 
in a simple model. Two firms invest in R&D, 
which results either in an innovation (with 
probability q) or not (with probability 1 − q). 
Suppose that the innovation can be pro-
tected only by secrecy. Secrecy is effective 
with probability α. If only one firm succeeds 
in its R&D, it earns monopoly profits. If both 
firms succeed, each firm earns duopoly prof-
its π D < π M/2. The firms can choose their 
success probability by paying c(q) = Rq2/2. 
If firm one chooses q1 and firm two chooses 
28 This incentive is also affected by the legal situation 
surrounding “prior-user rights.” These are the rights given 
to the original innovator if he relied on secrecy, but a 
subsequent imitator obtained a patent on the innovation. 
Generally, such rights are limited, although some juris-
dictions allow them in certain cases (notably the United 
States, for business methods). 
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q2, the expected profits for firm one are 
equal to:
(7)  q 1 (1 −  q 2 )α π  M +  q 1  q 2 α π  D  − R q 1 2/2.
If we introduce the possibility that a firm 
can patent, now firm one has to choose how 
to protect its innovation before it learns 
whether the competitor has successfully 
innovated. It has two options: it can either 
patent or use secrecy. If both firms are 
successful and file for a patent, each firm 
obtains the patent with probability one half. 
The strength of the patent α p is defined as the 
probability that a patent holder can exclude 
the competitor from using the invention. 
Using equation (7), it is easy to show that pat-
enting is the dominant strategy, even if the 
patent offers weaker protection than secrecy. 
The intuition is that if the probability that 
the second inventor can innovate is large, the 
innovator may prefer to patent to make sure 
that the other inventor cannot patent.
Kultti, Takalo, and Toikka (2007) extends 
the model to an infinite horizon discrete 
time model with a continuum of inventors 
and ideas. The results are similar—if patent 
strength is strong, all firms patent and if pat-
ent strength is weak, all firms choose secrecy. 
However, there is an intermediate range of 
patent strength where some firms choose to 
patent and others choose secrecy. They then 
go on to characterize the optimal patent 
strength from a welfare perspective. While 
intuitive, the model ignores the possibility 
that firms might torpedo each other through 
strategic disclosure in the form of defensive 
publications, which would jeopardize the 
possibility to patent the resulting invention. 
If such strategic disclosure is possible, this 
would give rise to strategic interaction in the 
form of private arrangements in which favor-
able exclusive bilateral licensing agreements 
are negotiated, which could undo the incen-
tives for the race (see discussion in section 
3.3 below).
Mosel (2011) revisits the results obtained 
by AY discussed previously by extending the 
Kultti et al. framework to allow for hetero-
geneity in the “quality” of innovations. The 
main differences from AY are that (a) both 
companies conduct R&D, (b) patenting is 
costly, and (c) there is full disclosure if a firm 
decides to patent.29 This model produces 
results that are the reverse of those in AY: 
small innovations are not patented (because 
of the filing costs) while large innovations 
always are (because the benefit of patenting 
first relative to the competitor outweighs the 
patenting costs). This result seems to accord 
much better with reality (see sections 2 and 
4), although, empirically, a more important 
determinant of the choice of secrecy over 
patenting may be the ability to keep the 
invention secret. The model allows such vari-
ability via a single parameter, but the param-
eter is held constant in the static analysis. 
3.1.3. Lead Time and Complexity
Many of the firm surveys that ask about the 
use of methods to appropriate the returns 
to R&D and innovation find that firms rate 
lead time (the first mover advantage) and 
complexity at least as, if not more important, 
than patenting for protecting their innova-
tions. The discussion so far attributed to 
disclosure the decisive role in a company’s 
decision whether to protect an invention 
through patenting or secrecy, although the 
work by Zaby (2010) hinted at the possibility 
that a technological lead might play a role in 
the decision, and a number of models show 
that when this lead is large, the inventor may 
prefer not to patent and use secrecy. Patents 
will be preferred by the inventor only when 
its technological lead is moderate. 
29 The model also allows for the possibility that patent 
applications get rejected, which is assumed to be a func-
tion of the “quality” of an innovation and a patent renewal 
decision. But these features are not crucial for the main 
results of the model.
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Schneider (2008) studies a model similar to 
Zaby’s model, but where the form of competi-
tion is left unspecified, in order to allow for a 
full range of duopoly profits. He assumes that 
there is one lead innovator and one potential 
follower innovator. If the follower innovates, 
the two products compete. The follower only 
tries to innovate if he expects to make prof-
its, which depends on the cost of R&D and 
nature of competition. This gives rise to the 
possibility that the lead innovator chooses to 
keep an invention secret in order to prevent 
disclosure, which will raise the cost of the 
follower’s R&D. Schneider’s model suggests 
that this is only rational “when the speed of 
discovery of the subsequent invention is high 
[for the lead innovator], relative to the com-
petitor’s” (Schneider 2008: 1349). In other 
words, the lead innovator has the ability to 
generate a series of new products and secrecy 
prevents a competitor entering the race. This 
conclusion is essentially the same as that in 
the previously cited Zaby (2010). Both reach 
the conclusion that firms with a large techno-
logical lead over their competitors may prefer 
secrecy to patenting.
There is a small literature that explores 
the role of strategic interaction among imita-
tors in influencing the innovator’s incentives 
to patent. In this literature, an innovator can 
strategically delay entry by imitators, i.e., 
create lead time, by providing incentives for 
imitators to free-ride on each other’s imita-
tion efforts. This creates a delay between 
innovation and imitation even in the absence 
of patents. The decision to patent, therefore, 
depends on whether profits from secrecy 
exploiting the strategically created lead time 
exceed those obtained from patenting. In the 
model by Henry and Ruiz-Aliseda (2012), 
innovators achieve lead time by investing in 
technology that protects an invention, such 
as product complexity. In Henry and Ponce 
(2011), innovators use licensing to potential 
imitators strategically to create lead time. 
In Anton and Yao (1994), an innovator also 
exploits (the threat of) licensing to appropri-
ate returns to his invention. But the mecha-
nism is different because this model assumes 
imperfect information and hence the need to 
disclose information to attract licensees. We 
discuss each of these models in turn.
Henry and Ruiz-Aliseda (2012) allow an 
innovator to invest in making it harder for 
potential competitors to imitate an innovation 
via reverse engineering. If imitation is costly, 
imitators also have to decide whether to pro-
tect the imitation from copying because, if the 
imitator fails to patent, all other imitators can 
imitate at zero costs. Henry and Ruiz-Aliseda 
(2012) show that, if imitation costs are suf-
ficiently large, imitators will delay reverse 
engineering in the hope that another imitator 
pays the costs first, which would then allow 
them to imitate without incurring the costs 
associated with overcoming copy protection. 
Hence, innovators may choose secrecy over 
patents for technologies where secrecy can be 
accompanied by product complexity so that 
reverse engineering can be made very costly. 
Henry and Ponce (2011) use a similar model 
of competition among imitators to show that 
innovators can strategically create lead time 
over their competitors without using a patent. 
They analyze a setup in which an inventor 
can sell specific knowledge on an invention to 
potential imitators and these potential imita-
tors have the choice between costly imitation 
and acquisition of the knowledge. In equilib-
rium, inventors choose to sell their technology 
in a way that allows acquiring firms to resell 
the knowledge to other firms. As a result, once 
the first imitator has acquired the knowledge 
and entered the market, he will compete with 
the innovator in the market for knowledge 
and drive prices for the knowledge to zero. 
This is, nevertheless, optimal for the inventor 
because potential imitators do not immedi-
ately enter the market, but wait in the hope 
that another firm enters first and drives down 
the price of the required  knowledge. This 
produces a situation in which the  inventor 
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enjoys a temporary monopoly position with-
out recourse to a patent. 
The Henry–Ponce model implies that the 
more tradable knowledge is, holding the pat-
ent term life constant, the more likely firms 
are to rely on secrecy rather than patents 
(assuming patenting is more expensive than 
maintaining an invention secret). The intu-
ition behind this is that the certain length 
of the protection granted by a patent has to 
outweigh the relative costs associated with 
patents because inventors can also reap 
monopoly profits from the delayed entry of 
imitators. 
The mechanisms used by an inventor 
to appropriate returns from innovating in 
Henry and Ponce (2011) are fundamentally 
different from the seminal Anton and Yao 
(1994) model. In Anton and Yao (1994), a 
financially constrained inventor sells an 
invention to two companies, which invent 
it themselves with some probability. They 
assume that the invention cannot be pro-
tected by a patent and that the companies 
cannot observe the quality of the inven-
tion ex ante. Anton and Yao show that in 
equilibrium, the inventor first fully reveals 
the invention to the buyer before signing a 
contract. Although the buyer could use the 
disclosed invention without compensating 
the inventor, the buyer will offer the inven-
tor a contract ex post with a strictly posi-
tive payoff. This is optimal, from the buyer’s 
perspective, to keep the inventor from also 
selling the invention to its competitor. The 
model, therefore, shows how an inventor 
can obtain rents without recourse to pat-
ent protection in a setting characterized by 
incomplete information, due to the threat 
of competition among the buyers. While 
these models offer plausible ways for com-
panies to appropriate returns to innovation 
without patents, it appears, however, that in 
practice firms find patents convenient when 
constructing knowledge contracts (see also 
sections 2 and 4).
3.1.4. Cumulative or Sequential Innovation
The aforementioned models of secrecy 
and patenting assume that innovations are 
discrete and use a one invention (or one inno-
vation)–one patent model. The innovation 
usually takes the form of a process innova-
tion that lowers production costs. However, 
in reality innovations are often complex, 
involving many inventions covered by pat-
ents and also cumulative (or sequential), 
i.e., inventors build on the innovations of 
others. At a very basic level, in industries 
where innovation is cumulative, secrecy can 
lead to duplication of efforts. For example, 
Erkal (2005) obtains this result in a model 
with two sequential innovations (each one 
involving a race between two innovators). 
The key assumption of the model is that, 
if the first innovator relies on secrecy, then 
the subsequent innovators do not have as 
much knowledge, which not surprisingly 
does lead to duplication of efforts. Thus, in 
cases where sequential innovation is impor-
tant and there are several innovators, she 
argues that it may be worthwhile increasing 
the breadth of patent protection (since this 
will encourage the use of patents and asso-
ciated disclosure). 
Scotchmer and Green (1990) were the 
first to look at the question of whether the 
inventor of a “weak” or “partial” invention 
that provides information for subsequent 
research will choose to patent it or keep it 
secret, and whether the novelty requirement 
should be weak to encourage disclosure of 
such an invention. They conclude that such a 
requirement will not help much because the 
firm can always choose not to patent, even 
if it is possible. They also show that the first 
invention is more likely to be patented under 
a first-to-file system (which is now the norm 
around the world) than under a first-to-invent 
system. However, neither of these systems is 
first best, a fact that they have also explored 
in other work (Green and Scotchmer 1995). 
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Ponce (2011) lays out a model that is 
similar to Scotchmer and Green’s, but adds 
the assumption that disclosure (patenting) 
creates prior art, which increases the dif-
ficulty of patenting subsequent inventions. 
In Ponce’s model, the first innovator trades 
off the effect disclosure has on lowering the 
probability that the rival innovator patents 
with the effect that the disclosed informa-
tion has in helping the rival to successfully 
innovate. When disclosure has little effect 
on the probability of obtaining subsequent 
inventions, lowering the novelty standard 
for patenting increases disclosure, whereas 
when disclosure strongly affects subsequent 
innovation, lowering the standard leads to 
more use of secrecy. Deriving welfare effects 
for the choice of patentability standard is 
complex, but generally follows from these 
observations. 
Bhattachaya and Guriev (2006) look at 
a different situation: instead of sequential 
invention, they consider sequential R&D, 
where R&D is split between companies that 
perform R(esearch) and D(evelopment) 
separately. In the model, there is a single 
inventor and two companies that develop the 
invention into a marketable innovation. The 
existence of two developers is a key differ-
ence from the Anton and Yao (1994) model 
discussed, where the equilibrium result has 
a single firm developing the invention. In 
Bhattachaya and Guriev’s model, the inven-
tor comes up with an invention that he then 
licenses to a developer. Developers pro-
duce innovations using either the licensed 
invention or whatever information about 
the invention they can obtain through a pat-
ent publication or disclosure during licens-
ing negotiations. The information on the 
invention, as well as the development effort, 
produce with some likelihood a market-
able innovation. If only one developer suc-
ceeds in obtaining an innovation, he acts as 
a monopolist in the product market, whereas 
if both developers succeed, they compete 
under Bertrand. The inventor has the choice 
to patent or to maintain his invention secret. 
Patenting discloses information to both 
developers. If the invention is patented, in 
equilibrium, an exclusive licensing contract 
with one developer is signed. If the inven-
tion is protected through secrecy, in prin-
ciple, no information about the invention 
leaks. Information is only transmitted by the 
inventor to negotiate a licensing agreement. 
Moreover, if secrecy is used to protect the 
invention, Bhattachaya and Guriev (2006) 
assume that the inventor could license the 
invention to one developer and then sub-
sequently license it opportunistically to the 
second developer, too. Even if the second 
developer did not acquire a license, he could 
use the information obtained during the 
licensing negotiations to innovate. To avoid 
this opportunistic behavior, developers opti-
mally offer the inventor a contract that gives 
the inventor a share of sales. 
This contract has the drawback that it low-
ers the optimal effort exerted by the devel-
oper, since he loses a share of his profits to 
the inventor. Since an inventor can move 
from secrecy to patenting but not vice versa, 
secrecy has to offer at least the same payoff 
as patenting to be optimal. The trade-off that 
emerges is that secrecy reduces information 
leakage but at the same time the royalty rate 
reduces the developers’ incentive to invest 
in development which lowers expected reve-
nues. Bhattachaya and Guriev show that this 
is the case for sufficiently large disclosure 
and a valuable invention. The optimal share 
of revenues paid to the inventor decreases 
in disclosure (lower return from opportunis-
tic behavior) and the value of the invention 
(higher expected revenue). Since a lower 
share increases the incentives for the devel-
oper to exert effort and to produce a success-
ful innovation, the payoff for the inventor 
increases. This result—secrecy is preferred 
for more valuable and less codifiable inven-
tions—is reminiscent of the AY model 
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 discussed earlier. However, the mechanisms 
are fundamentally different.
3.2. Combined Patent–Secrecy Strategy
While we have described the choice 
between patenting and secrecy as a mutually 
exclusive decision, the upper-left quadrant 
of table 4 suggests the possibility that formal 
and informal methods may in fact be com-
bined to protect an invention. 
Arora (1997), for example, documents the 
early days of the organic chemical industry 
which provide an example of a situation in 
which firms resorted to both secrecy and pat-
enting to protect innovations. Arora argues 
that certain chemical innovations were com-
posed of tacit elements, notably the specific 
combination of different compounds, which 
were protected by secrecy, and codified 
knowledge, i.e., individual compounds that 
were protected by patents. Arora argues, 
more generally, that knowledge based on 
“inductive and empiricist procedures” is hard 
to protect through patents because this type 
of knowledge is hard to codify and the cor-
responding claims would have to be narrow 
which would disclose a great deal of infor-
mation. Hence, according to Arora, for such 
inventions firms prefer to patent the codified 
aspects and to keep the remainder secret. 
Even in easily codifiable technologies, such 
as chemical compounds, the best practices of 
producing a compound may be kept secret,30 
which suggests that patents and secrecy can 
act as complements. This also explains why 
companies in the pharmaceutical industry 
commonly report relying heavily on both 
patents and secrecy (Cohen, Nelson, and 
Walsh 2000, tables 1 and 2).
30 However, in the United States before the 2012 
America Invents Act, patentees were required to dis-
close the best mode for practicing the patented invention 
according to the Patent Act of 1952 (for more discussion 
see Love and Seaman 2012).
Graham (2004) studies the case where 
firms combine patenting and secrecy by 
staging the revelation of information, keep-
ing the codified part of an invention secret 
while preserving the option to obtain patent 
protection in the future. He observes that, in 
the U.S. patent system prior to 1999, patent 
applications remained secret until the patent 
issued. By using a continuation, continuation-
in-part, or a division, assignees were thus able 
to keep a pending patent application secret 
for an extended period of time, while main-
taining the early priority. In this way, firms 
were able to effectively combine the benefits 
of patent protection with trade secrecy and 
to avoid the trade-off between patent protec-
tion and disclosure. Prior to 1995, when the 
term of the patent was seventeen years from 
the grant date, rather than twenty years from 
the application date, there was little cost in 
terms of length of patent term to this strat-
egy. Graham suggests that the combination 
of secrecy and patenting through continua-
tion was particularly interesting to firms that 
had a first-mover advantage in new techno-
logical fields in which the incumbents were 
threatened by entry that could displace the 
incumbent’s technology. However, if lead 
time is important, Graham argues that firms 
were less likely to use secrecy and continu-
ation, due to the fact that lead time and 
secrecy are substitutes. Hegde, Mowery, 
and Graham (2009) show that firms may still 
combine secrecy with patenting, to some 
extent, because continuations still offer the 
possibility to alter individual claims thereby 
effectively extending secrecy with regard to 
specific claims.
Although the available anecdotal evidence 
suggests that firms indeed combine secrecy 
with patenting, there are no theoretical 
models that explore this possibility and the 
incentives to do so in more detail. Especially 
the possibility to rely on patents and secrecy 
at different stages of the research and 
 development process of an innovation might 
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offer an interesting avenue for further 
research.
3.3. No Patent, No Secrecy—Disclosure
The final cell of table 4 contains the 
case where firms choose to simply disclose 
an invention, for example, in the form of 
a defensive publication, without having 
recourse to patent protection. 
In contrast to secrecy, defensive pub-
lications still guarantee a firm’s freedom-
to-operate and de facto secrecy may even 
be maintained as the information that is 
revealed can be restricted or substantially 
disguised. Defensive publications may be 
used strategically by firms to influence 
the state of prior art relevant to competi-
tors’ patent applications (Lichtman, Baker, 
and Kraus 2000; Baker and Mezzetti 2005; 
Bar 2006). Hence, disclosing previously 
unknown information to the public can 
raise the inventive step threshold, jeopardiz-
ing competitors’ patent applications. Ponce 
(2007) considers this type of voluntary dis-
closure in an environment with two innova-
tors who have to choose whether to patent or 
not in a sequential fashion. The first innova-
tor who patents may face the risk of being 
imitated. However, the use of secrecy is asso-
ciated with two additional threats: duplica-
tion (when the second innovator develops a 
similar invention) and exclusion (occurring 
when an imitator obtains a patent for a simi-
lar innovation). In this environment, the first 
innovator may prefer secrecy if the protec-
tion it can get from secrecy is larger than the 
protection offered by a patent net of the pat-
enting costs. Still, a firm that opts for secrecy 
will want to disclose knowledge, as it may 
stop the second innovator from developing 
the same innovation and patenting it. If so, 
in equilibrium, the first innovator discloses 
a sufficiently large amount of information 
such that the second innovator has no incen-
tive to patent. In this type of equilibrium, 
where patent protection is weak and product 
market competition is not too intense, both 
innovators opt for secrecy, but there may be 
still disclosure of technical knowledge.
Raising the prior art bar may not be the only 
function of strategic disclosure. Gill (2008) 
offers a model in which an innovator that has 
a lead over its competitor uses disclosure to 
persuade the competitor to leave the patent 
race. Gill’s model has two stages in which 
innovators invest in an R&D project. The 
leader obtains an intermediate research out-
come first and has to decide whether to invest 
further to turn it into a marketable innova-
tion. The innovator can choose to disclose 
the intermediate research results (but not the 
amount of disclosure). This has two effects in 
the model: on the one hand, disclosure offers 
useful knowledge to the competitor; on the 
other hand, it informs the follower about the 
leader’s commitment to the research project. 
When the latter effect outweighs the former, 
disclosure makes the follower quit the patent 
race after the first stage. In Gill’s model, the 
leader only discloses if he continues invest-
ing in the R&D project because disclosure 
is costly. Disclosure then occurs only when 
development costs in the second stage are 
sufficiently large. The intuition for this is sim-
ple. If development costs are high, the inno-
vator has an incentive to abandon the project 
himself unless chances to win the race are 
sufficiently high. Disclosure helps increasing 
the chances by providing a credible signal to 
the follower of commitment to staying in the 
race, thereby pushing the follower out of the 
race. Perhaps more interestingly, for interme-
diate development costs, the model suggests 
that lead time itself is sufficient to push the 
follower out of the race, because the follower 
still believes the leader invests in the second-
stage development. Hence, the leader does 
not need to disclose to drive out the follower, 
although the option to disclose is crucial for 
this effect to work.
Anton and Yao (2008) look at the situa-
tion in which sellers waive the signing of 
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 confidentiality agreements when they nego-
tiate the sale of innovation protected by 
secrecy.31 This counterintuitive behavior, 
voluntarily foregoing the ability to enforce 
secrecy, can be optimal to attract buyers who 
have incomplete information on the innova-
tion on offer. Anton and Yao (2008) show that 
if buyers have incomplete information on the 
innovation on sale, waiving trade secrecy is 
optimal for sellers to attract potential buyers 
as it eliminates the threat of ex post litigation 
for buyers if they fail to acquire the innova-
tion. While the model offers an explanation 
for why innovators may choose to disclose an 
invention that could be protected by trade 
secrecy and a nondisclosure agreement, the 
innovator would strictly benefit from using 
a registered IP right, such as a patent, if he 
were able to do so. Hence, the model applies 
to a setting in which an innovator chooses 
between informal IP protection in the form 
of trade secrecy and no IP protection.
The open source software sector provides 
an example of an entire sector that is based 
on the absence of patenting and secrecy. 
However, this does not mean that IP pro-
tection is foregone completely in this sec-
tor. Frequently, various forms of copyright 
protection accompanied by a General Public 
License (GPL) are used to ensure that the 
particular software in question remains open. 
Gambardella and Hall (2006) study 
the general phenomenon of knowledge 
 production in an open (no patent, no secrecy) 
environment. They show that an equilibrium 
31 Confidentiality agreements are often considered nec-
essary to claim misappropriation of proprietary informa-
tion in contract negotiations. For example, in a recent New 
York court case, Edelman v. Starwood Capital Group, LLC 
(NY Slip Op. 09309), investor Edelman failed in his claim 
for misappropriation of confidential information against 
investor Starwood LLC, despite having expressly marked 
the documents provided to Starwood during their failed 
business negotiations as confidential. The court pointed 
out that, to obtain trade secrecy protection in this context, 
Edelman would have had to sign a confidentiality agree-
ment with Starwood.
with free sharing of knowledge and no IP 
protection can exist, but that such an equi-
librium is unstable against a defector who 
chooses to privatize his knowledge (this case 
is effectively an example of Olson’s (1971) 
Logic of Collective Action). They show that 
such defection becomes more probable as 
the number of knowledge producers grows 
or the value of a particular participant’s addi-
tion to knowledge rises. Therefore, without 
some kind of coordination, production of the 
public knowledge good (science or research 
software or database) can be suboptimal. 
The authors show that if “lead” researchers 
(or “lead” programmers) are able to establish 
a norm of contribution to the public good, a 
better outcome can be achieved, and that a 
GPL is a possible such mechanism. They give 
a small example of the breakdown of a no-IP 
equilibrium based on the observed privatiza-
tion of econometric software production. 
3.4 The Life Cycle of Firms and Industry
The use of patents for the appropriation of 
returns to investment in innovation appears to 
evolve as firms and industries mature. History 
is replete with examples of new technologies 
that developed without patents and with con-
siderable sharing of knowledge, such as textile 
looms (Foray and Hilaire Perez 2006), the 
Cleveland (UK) iron industry over the period 
1850–75 (Allen 1983), and Cornish pumping 
equipment (Nuvolari 2004). To some extent, 
a modern example is the software industry in 
the U.S., which relied heavily on secrecy and 
copyright until a series of legal decisions in the 
mid-1990s rendered software patentable.32 
This example illustrates that after the initial 
growth of a new  technology and industry, a 
constituency of successful firms develops that 
wishes to protect their technology via patents. 
32 Of course, the ultimate causal source for these events 
was not the courts, but the firms in the industry (including 
the largest, IBM) who sued the Patent Office when their 
patent applications were rejected. 
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Such a constituency will sue to expand pat-
entable subject matter if their technology 
is not already included, and in any case will 
transition the sector from an open knowl-
edge-sharing one to one where IP is more 
protected, as described by Gambardella and 
Hall (2006).
Boldrin and Levine (2013) make a simi-
lar argument, emphasizing that firms switch 
to using (that is, enforcing) patents when 
the industry matures in which they oper-
ate and demand stagnates. This argument 
follows the “industry shakeout” literature 
pioneered by Jovanovich and MacDonald 
(1994) and Klepper (1996). In the Jovanovic 
and MacDonald (1994) model, firms in an 
industry compete to market an exogenous 
invention. Firms enter into the market to 
turn the invention (with some exogenously 
fixed) probability into an innovation. The 
invention is refined at a later stage, offering 
firms that had innovated before the opportu-
nity to innovate again. New firms can keep 
entering during that process and attempt to 
innovate. Since the innovation lowers mar-
ginal production costs, firms that innovate 
increase output. As a result prices fall. As 
output expands and prices fall, firms that 
failed to innovate exit. The model produces a 
shakeout of companies, i.e., a sudden exit of a 
large number of firms, if price falls fast. This 
can occur either because innovating creates 
a large drop in marginal costs, or because 
of a high likelihood of innovation. Klepper’s 
(1996) model allows firms to generate both 
product and process innovations. Process 
innovation reduces average costs. Because 
of increasing returns to process innovation, 
larger firms have more incentives to invest 
in process innovation. This implies that ear-
lier incumbents have a cost advantage over 
entrants. Entrants may still find it profit-
able to enter the market if profits from their 
product innovation are sufficiently large. 
However, as companies’ output grows, prices 
fall to such a low level that entry ceases. In 
the model, firms carry out different types of 
product innovation, which means as entry 
stops, fewer product innovations are avail-
able in the market. Because of this, as well 
as increasing returns to process innovation, 
process innovation expands at the expense of 
product innovation. The market is left with 
fewer and larger companies that produce a 
smaller range and number of new products.
Boldrin and Levine (2013) argue that indus-
tries are characterized by the absence of pat-
ents during the innovation phases. Following 
a shakeout, the remaining firms begin to 
prefer patents over alternative mechanisms 
to secure their oligopoly rents. They suggest 
that patterns observed in patent litigation in 
the United States confirm this hypothesis. 
Notably, companies that see decline in their 
revenue shares of a market, such as Texas 
Instruments, begin to rely on patent litigation 
to extract rents from entrants.
Although true, the fact that declining firms 
turn to enforcing their patents is not neces-
sarily always a negative thing. In principle, 
a bankrupt or money-losing firm normally 
attempts to capture as much salvage value as 
it can from the assets it owns. The fact that 
firms can do this if they fail helps them to raise 
money from investors ex ante, since the inves-
tors stand to lose less in the event of failure 
than if the assets were simply abandoned. To 
the extent that patentable technology has sal-
vage value and serves as an asset to the firm, 
it is appropriate that the exiting firm try to 
realize that value via enforcement or sale to 
another entity that is able to realize the value.33
33 Much of the critique of this kind of activity is based 
on the facts that the patents thus enforced may be of low 
quality and may rely on a kind of holdup strategy where 
it is cheaper for the accused infringer to settle, rather 
than to test the patent’s validity (e.g., Lemley and Shapiro 
2005). That is, in principle it is appropriate for a nonpro-
ducing entity to realize value from a patent portfolio, but 
various features of current patent administration and legal 
enforcement make such strategies more of a tax on innova-
tion than an incentive for innovative entry.
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4. Empirical Evidence
The surveys reviewed in section 2 gathered 
a large amount of information on companies’ 
perceptions on the importance of the dif-
ferent appropriation mechanisms and their 
self-reported use. The theoretical models dis-
cussed in the preceding section look at spe-
cific aspects of the trade-off that companies 
face in choosing a mechanism to appropriate 
returns to innovation. This section discusses 
the empirical literature that analyzes the 
determinants of firms’ choices of the differ-
ent appropriation mechanisms and the cor-
responding outcomes. In very few cases, this 
literature attempts to relate their results to 
the theoretical literature discussed earlier, 
but for the most part the empirical literature 
has evolved separately, partly due to lack of 
the appropriate data, as we discuss below. 
4.1 Registered IP and Secrecy as Substitutes
The empirical literature has focused over-
whelmingly on the determinants of a compa-
ny’s decision to opt for secrecy or a registered 
IP right, mostly in the form of patents. A large 
part of this literature has mostly been con-
ducted using data from various CIS, which 
have the advantage that they identify firms 
that have a product or process innovation and 
also collect information on the use of alterna-
tive appropriability methods. The drawback 
of using the CIS data, however, is that data are 
available only at the firm level. The question 
and the way the theoretical literature models 
the choice problem, however, concerns the 
invention. Since companies commonly pur-
sue a variety of activities, the CIS data may be 
inherently limited in answering the research 
question. Another issue concerns the patent-
ability of a firm’s inventions. The theoreti-
cal literature assumes that both patents and 
secrecy are available to a firm. If, however, 
an invention is not patentable (e.g., software 
with the European Patent Office), the choice 
problem collapses. This creates the risk of 
confounding the share of patented inventions 
within the set of patentable inventions (a 
subset of all inventions) with the share of pat-
ented inventions among all inventions. If not 
all inventions are patentable, this procedure 
underestimates a firm’s decision to patent 
and biases the inference if there are system-
atic differences across firms in the share of 
patentable inventions that they create. As dis-
cussed below, this problem, however, can be 
attenuated at least partly by conditioning the 
set of companies on the type of innovation 
that they report (e.g., product innovation that 
is “new to the market”). 
There is also a fundamental endogeneity 
problem in the analysis of these survey data. 
In his discussion of the original Levin et al. 
(1987) Yale I study, Gilbert (1987: 823) notes 
with regard to a set of questions on compe-
tition and risk of imitation that “there is an 
empirical problem with surveys of the rela-
tionship between competition and R&D. If 
R&D really does have an effect on entry and 
competition, then the sample is necessar-
ily biased.” Hall et al. (2013) offer another 
example of the endogeneity problem. They 
find that patenting firms rate the effective-
ness of patents as a mechanism to appropri-
ate returns significantly higher than firms that 
do not patent. Do firms patent more because 
they consider patents to be effective means to 
capitalize on an invention? Or do they rate pat-
ents as effective because they have patented 
(avoiding cognitive dissonance)? Regardless 
of these problems, some empirical regulari-
ties emerge across the various studies that use 
CIS data on different countries (and therefore 
slightly different institutional settings). The 
studies identify some characteristics of the 
industry and the innovative firms that affect 
the choice between secrecy and patents. 
The more insightful studies in this area, 
however, rely on invention-level data in 
combination with largely exogenous varia-
tion in the availability of IP protection across 
 jurisdictions. The third type of analysis does 
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not use invention-level data, but relies only 
on exogenous variation in the availability of 
IP protection across jurisdictions to infer 
the effect of changes in the strengthening 
of secrecy protection on research inputs and 
outputs. This approach avoids the aggrega-
tion problem of the survey-based studies, but 
relies instead on strong assumptions regard-
ing confounding factors that may influence 
the observed effect of a legal change on the 
outcome variable. We also briefly discuss 
a fourth approach that overcomes the dif-
ficulty in observing a firm’s use of secrecy 
by using data on court cases. The case-level 
data reveals information on the companies 
using (and misappropriating) trade secrets 
and, often, additional information on the 
characteristics and value of the inventions 
protected by secrecy. The problem with this 
type of analysis, however, is the endogenous 
selection into litigation. We discuss these 
four approaches in turn.
4.1.1. Survey (CIS)–Based Analysis
As reviewed in section 2, there are a large 
number of studies that use survey data to learn 
about the determinants of a firm’s assessment 
of the effectiveness of the different mecha-
nisms and their use. This literature does not 
test directly any of the theoretical models. 
Instead, it analyzes determinants of the use 
of different appropriation mechanisms by 
companies. Despite the endogeneity and 
measurement problems discussed above, the 
availability of some, albeit aggregate, informa-
tion on a firm’s innovative activities, including 
those that are not patented, as well as some self-
reported measure on firms’ reliance on the dif-
ferent appropriation mechanisms, has proven 
useful to establish some robust correlations.
Innovation, Company, and Industry 
Characteristics
Product versus process innovations. 
Studies using survey-based data consistently 
find that the use of patents is more associated 
with product innovations than with process 
innovations. The regression models differ 
slightly across studies, but product innova-
tions are consistently found to be positively 
correlated with patenting (inter alia Brouwer 
and Kleinknecht 1999; Arundel, van de Paal, 
and Soete 1995; Hall et al. 2013). These 
results can be interpreted in several ways. 
Most obviously, it is easier to use secrecy 
for process innovation than for product 
innovations. Product innovations are more 
likely to represent patentable subject mat-
ter, which means the uncertainty associated 
with the grant process may be lower. Patents 
on process innovations may also reveal more 
information than patents on products, which 
means firms prefer to patent product inno-
vations and keep process innovations secret. 
Finally, product innovations may be, on aver-
age, more valuable, hence the costs associ-
ated with patenting weigh less heavily.
Size. One of the main findings of the Yale 
and Carnegie Mellon surveys is that appro-
priability strategies vary across firms of dif-
ferent size. Larger companies regard patents 
as more important an appropriation strategy 
than smaller companies. These findings are 
confirmed in a large number of studies using 
the CIS (inter alia Brouwer and Kleinknecht 
1999; Arundel et al. 1995; Hall et al. 2013). 
The principle explanation for this finding is, 
doubtless, that large firms generally find the 
use of the patent system lower cost per pat-
ent than smaller firms for fixed cost reasons. 
Equally, small- and medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs) may suffer from financial 
constraints (see below) and, therefore, may 
decide that applying for a patent is financially 
too onerous. However, firms that specialize 
in knowledge production and proof of inno-
vative concept are more likely to be SMEs 
and for these firms, patents can be quite 
important, since most of their assets are 
knowledge assets. In addition, some startups 
may find that having patents improves their 
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access to financing (Hsu and Ziedonis 2008, 
inter alia). 
R&D intensity. Not surprisingly, patent-
ing is associated with the R&D performance 
within firms. In general, it is roughly propor-
tional in the cross section of manufacturing 
firms (Bound et al. 1984), but somewhat less 
than proportional within firm (Hausman, 
Hall, and Griliches 1984). Studies that look at 
the choice between patenting and secrecy for 
protection of innovation generally find that 
R&D-performing innovating firms are more 
likely to opt for patents than other innovat-
ing firms (presumably because they are more 
likely to have patentable inventions, e.g., Hall 
et al. 2013). The numbers in table 2 for U.S. 
firms clearly confirm this fact. 
Incremental versus large innovations. 
AY suggest that firms that produce large 
innovations should rely more on secrecy than 
on patents to protect their inventions. While 
counterintuitive, this prediction is tested in a 
paper by Pajak (2010) who uses the French 
version of the CIS 4 to model the choice 
between patenting and secrecy (binary vari-
ables of self-reported use) where the size of 
innovation (i.e., whether the innovation is 
new to the market or only to the industry) 
appears among the independent variables. 
He finds the rather equivocal result that in 
one-third of innovative industries (seven out 
of twenty-one) a larger innovation is posi-
tively correlated with a smaller patent-to-
secrecy ratio, in line with the predictions of 
AY, although for the other two-thirds, a larger 
innovation favors patenting over secrecy. 
Moreover, for his sample of small firms in 
intermediate goods sectors, Pajak finds that 
firms reporting innovations new to the firm 
are more likely to use patents, whereas the 
same firms seem to prefer secrecy for inven-
tions new to the market. This empirical 
finding should be interpreted with caution, 
however, as the estimates are merely corre-
lations, the  sample size is small (seventy-two 
firms) and the share of  innovating small firms 
is less than 10 percent (that is, only seven 
firms).
Financial constraints. Applying for a 
patent and managing a patent portfolio is 
expensive. A firm not only has to meet the 
direct monetary expenses associated with the 
application process, but it also has to monitor 
the market for potential infringement and 
take legal action if the patent is to serve its 
intended purpose of exclusion. Not surpris-
ingly, firms that report that they are finan-
cially constrained tend to use unregistered 
IP methods. As discussed earlier, the most 
important reason cited by startups for not 
patenting is cost (Graham et al. 2009). See 
also Cordes, Hertzfeld, and Vonortas (1999), 
who report on a survey of small high technol-
ogy firms done for the U.S. Small Business 
Administration, which found that cost of 
applying and enforcement was the lead-
ing reason these firms did not generally use 
patents. However, Hall et al. (2013) found 
only very weak evidence that the presence of 
financial constraints reduced the probability 
of patenting, once firms’ size and sector were 
controlled for. 
Knowledge management practice. 
Jensen and Webster (2009) use survey data 
on a set of 785 Australian firms to under-
stand the interaction between firms’ knowl-
edge management practices and their choice 
of knowledge appropriation mechanisms. 
They find firms that pursue a “closed learn-
ing style” rely more on patents and secrecy. 
Whereas firms that base their technological 
learning on a more open model that involves 
exchange across firms are more likely to rely 
on lead time, brand names, and control over 
the distribution process. This provides addi-
tional evidence that patents and secrecy can 
act as complementary forms of knowledge 
appropriation mechanisms within a “closed” 
knowledge management model that relies 
on the acquisition of knowledge through 
licenses, the reading of (patent) publications, 
and in-house R&D.
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In contrast, Cosh and Zhang (2011) find 
that UK firms engaged in open innovation 
practices are more likely to use IP protection 
methods of all types. Hagedoorn and Ridder 
(2012) interview and survey European firms 
involved in open innovation, and report that 
they tend to use formal contracts to govern 
their interactions with partners, and that 
over 90 percent viewed patents and trade 
secrets as the most important mechanisms 
for protection of their IP in these relation-
ships, in strong contrast to the Jensen and 
Webster result. 
Impact on Performance 
A small literature based on survey data 
analyzes the impact that the choice of IP 
instrument has on the firms’ performance. 
This literature is not very developed, and 
while issues associated to the identification 
strategy are unresolved, it is still interest-
ing to report on some results that can offer 
guidance for future empirical analysis. Hanel 
(2008) analyzes the use of IP protection for 
the Canadian manufacturing industry, pay-
ing attention to a possible effect on profits. 
As a first step, he focuses on the propensity 
of innovative firms to protect their IP. Small 
firms use IP protection tools less often, 
whereas “world-first” inventors use every 
kind of IP protection more frequently than 
other firms. In the second stage, he focuses 
on the impact that the use of IP protection 
has on the firms’ profits. He finds that firms 
that protect their IP increased or maintained 
their profit. 
Hussinger (2006) uses 626 manufacturing 
firms from the Mannheim Innovation Panel 
(1998–2000, CIS III) to analyze the impact 
on the percentage of sales of new products 
of the use of patents and secrecy. There is a 
strong positive correlation between patents 
and sales with new products, whereas there 
is no relationship between secrecy and inno-
vative sales. This finding is consistent with 
the hypothesis that patents are preferred to 
secrecy for protecting valuable inventions 
in the market phase, but is not support-
ive of the several models that suggest that 
smaller, rather than large inventions will be 
patented. This paper is noteworthy for the 
fact that the author uses lagged patent hold-
ings as an instrument for the firm’s current 
evaluation of patent importance, control-
ling, to some extent, for the endogeneity of 
the choice of IP. Unfortunately, she is unable 
to look at process innovation due to the lack 
of data on the degree or importance of this 
kind of innovation (as opposed to simply its 
presence). 
4.1.2. Invention-Level Evidence
The main limitations of the survey-based 
literature is, on the one hand, the endogene-
ity of firms’ self-reported effectiveness of the 
various IP mechanisms and their use and, on 
the other hand, the fact that data are avail-
able only at the aggregate, firm-level. There 
are a few studies that overcome these limita-
tions by using invention-level data in com-
bination with exogenous differences in the 
legal protection of formal and informal IP 
over time and across jurisdictions.
Moser (2005) exploits such exogenous 
differences in the availability of patent pro-
tection across countries in the nineteenth 
century. Moser looks at innovations pre-
sented at two World Fairs (London in 1851 
and Philadelphia in 1876). Some of these 
innovations were patented and some were 
not, which was partly a result of the fact 
that not all countries had patent laws at that 
time (Switzerland and Denmark in 1851 and 
Switzerland and the Netherlands in 1876). 
Her findings suggest that patent protection 
is not critical to innovation, but it does have 
a strong effect on the industrial distribu-
tion of innovative activity. Countries without 
patent protection tended to concentrate in 
industries where secrecy was effective (as 
reverse engineering was not so easy and law 
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protected trade secrets). Textiles, food pro-
cessing, scientific instruments and watch 
making were examples; and countries such 
as Switzerland, which had no patent system, 
concentrated in these industries. In contrast, 
innovations from the United States (which 
had a relatively low cost and effective patent 
protection and a patchy way of protecting 
trade secrets) concentrated in machinery. 
The Netherlands abolished its patent laws 
in 1869 and this led, according to Moser, to 
a substantial increase in innovations coming 
from food processing, where secrecy was 
important. In other words, lack of an IP sys-
tem (or a weak one) does not stop firms from 
innovating, but can have implications for the 
direction of innovative activity. 
In a similar analysis, Moser (2012) com-
pares British and U.S. inventions exhibited 
at four global fairs in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. She has data on over 
8,000 inventions exhibited at the Crystal 
Palace World’s Fair in London in 1851, the 
Centennial Exhibition in Philadelphia in 
1876, the World’s Columbian Exposition in 
Chicago in 1893, and the Panama–Pacific 
International Exposition in San Francisco in 
1915. Although both the United States and 
Britain had a patent system in place through-
out the period studied, patenting in Britain 
was more expensive (by a factor of sixty) 
than in the United States. Enforcement 
also appears to have been more difficult and 
uncertain in Britain than the United States. 
Despite these substantial differences in the 
patent systems, Moser finds only a moder-
ate difference in patent rates: 11 percent of 
the exhibited British and 15 percent of the 
U.S. inventions were patented. Moser shows 
that the share of British inventions that were 
awarded a prize at the Crystal Palace World’s 
Fair is larger among patented inventions. 
This suggests that more valuable inven-
tions are more frequently patented, directly 
contradicting the theoretical prediction 
by AY. The data obtained from exhibition 
catalogues also reveal large cross-sectional 
differences across industries: among U.S. 
inventions, the share of patented inventions 
in manufacturing of machinery is 44 percent 
whereas none exist in chemicals. During 
the time of the Crystal Palace World’s Fair, 
inventions in chemicals could be protected 
effectively by secrecy, whereas inventions 
in machinery would have been easy to copy 
and, therefore, relied more heavily on pat-
ents. Perhaps more interestingly, Moser 
shows that a decrease in the effectiveness 
of secrecy in the chemical industry (brought 
about by important inventions in the mid- 
nineteenth century—the model of benzene 
ring and the periodic table) resulted in a sub-
stantial increase in patenting.34 This intrain-
dustry result supports the explanation that 
interindustry differences in the reliance on 
patents are largely driven by their effective-
ness in a given sector.
Moser’s work is noteworthy not only 
because of the marked differences in the 
type of inventions exhibited by inventors 
from jurisdictions with and without patent 
protection, but also because she observes 
the combination of product-level data and 
patents. Most empirical analysis only has 
firm-level data, where usually no direct link 
between products and the different protec-
tion mechanisms exists. This is a major short-
coming. Think only of larger companies, 
which routinely come up with a diverse range 
of inventions. They are very likely to use all 
types of protection mechanisms, although 
the type of protection mechanism used may 
vary systematically by type of invention. 
Moreover, products often embody a range of 
inventions, which may be protected by dif-
ferent mechanisms. Hence, even the combi-
nation of product and patent data may not 
be enough if products embody inventions 
protected by other means than patents, 
34 On patenting and the nineteenth-century German 
chemical industry, see also Murmann (2003). 
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which remain unobserved to the researcher. 
This makes the setup that Moser uses for 
her study so valuable because the choice of 
protection mechanisms is limited for largely 
exogenous reasons. 
Having said that, Moser (2013) empha-
sizes that the evidence obtained from histori-
cal data has to be interpreted with care if the 
objective is to translate the findings to apply 
to today’s world. The patenting landscape 
has undoubtedly become more complex in 
recent years, as the range of technologies 
has expanded, especially in areas where the 
format of patent rights appears to fit rather 
poorly. An example is the large increase in 
the number of patent filings in electrical 
engineering, especially telecommunication 
and computer technologies, and the diffi-
culty of delineating patents from each other, 
which has contributed to the emergence of 
patent thickets in these technologies (von 
Graevenitz, Wagner, and Harhoff 2011).
4.1.3. Evidence from Legal Changes
The literature offers a third approach to 
the problem of estimating empirically the 
impact of the effectiveness of the different 
appropriation mechanisms on companies’ 
choices and performance. Png (2011) pro-
vides an example of analysis of the impact 
of secrecy on R&D and the choice between 
patenting and secrecy without having survey 
information on a firm’s innovative activities 
or self-reported use of formal and informal 
IP. He uses the NBER Compustat Patent 
dataset, which contains firm-level data for 
all publicly traded companies in the U.S. 
manufacturing sector, to assess the impact of 
a strengthening of legal protection of trade 
secrets through enactment of the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act (UTSA). Png finds that 
enactment of the UTSA is associated with an 
average drop of 2.4 percent in R&D among 
manufacturing firms. However, the figure 
disguises important heterogeneity across 
sectors. Whereas the drop is even more 
 pronounced for the medicinal chemicals and 
botanicals sector (–4.2 percent), as well as 
the computer terminals industry (–4.7 per-
cent), Png does not find an impact in rela-
tively more R&D-intensive industries such as 
pharmaceuticals and computer communica-
tions equipment. The results are interpreted 
as suggesting that own R&D and knowledge 
spillovers are complements, i.e., an increase 
in the use of secrecy leads to a decrease of 
spillovers, which leads to a net decrease in 
R&D given the complementarity of spill-
overs with a firm’s own R&D efforts. Png 
also analyzes the effect of the strengthening 
of legal trade secret protection on firms’ pat-
ent filings, but finds, overall, no discernible 
impact. However, he finds some evidence 
that it reduced patenting in sectors in which 
patents are effective in protecting process 
innovations. Png interprets these findings as 
evidence for firms filing patents mostly for 
strategic reasons, rather than to appropriate 
returns to an innovation. 
Younge and Marx (2012) pursue a similar 
approach analyzing the effect of a strength-
ening of secrecy, in the form of employee 
noncompete agreements in the state of 
Michigan, on firms’ market valuation. 
Younge and Marx find a strong, prompt-
positive response on firms’ Tobin’s q to a law 
that made noncompete agreements enforce-
able. The positive response to a strengthen-
ing of trade secrecy suggests that companies 
gain from an improved ability to maintain 
knowledge within the firm. However, the 
effect patterns out over time. This effect is 
stronger in sectors that are known to rely 
relatively more on secrecy. Younge and Marx 
interpret evidence from changes in patent-
ing activities of companies to suggest that 
the eventual drop in firms’ market valuation 
is due to firms’ R&D becoming narrower as 
a consequence of the law change. 
In another study that looks at market valu-
ation and the strength of legal protection of 
trade secrecy, Carr and Gorman (2001) look 
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at the effect of the Economic Espionage Act 
(EEA), which was enacted in the United 
States in 1996. It criminalized the theft of 
trade secrets in the United States (and by 
U.S. citizens worldwide), which offered an 
additional legal tool for the enforcement 
of trade secrecy over existing federal and 
state law. Carr and Gorman look at changes 
in the stock market valuation of companies 
involved in eleven cases filed under EEA 
between 1996 and 2000. Carr and Gorman 
gauge the value of the stolen trade secrets 
from court records and interviews with attor-
neys and companies. The conservative esti-
mates of these values range widely, between 
$0.04 and $20 million, with an average of $5 
million. Carr and Gorman find a negative 
response by stock markets to the revelation 
of trade secrecy theft in seven out of the 
eleven cases. The magnitude of the stock 
market loss dwarfs the alleged value of the 
stolen trade secrets.
The three studies in conjunction provide 
interesting evidence on the effect of trade 
secrecy on performance and R&D. In light 
of the empirical difficulty of observing the 
use of secrecy as an appropriation mecha-
nism, relying on exogenous changes in the 
legal framework that governs secrecy offers a 
window to studying the effect of secrecy. The 
results suggest that secrecy is an important 
protection mechanism of valuable inventions 
for companies. However, strengthening legal 
secrecy protection may come at a cost, as it 
may be correlated with fewer spillovers and 
even change the type of research that firms 
conduct.
4.1.4. Evidence from Litigation
There is a fourth approach to overcom-
ing the “unobservability” of companies’ use 
of secrecy. Lerner (2006) offers an overview 
of the entire history of civil state and federal 
courts cases in California and Massachusetts. 
However, state cases are limited to cases that 
were appealed.35 This illustrates a funda-
mental problem in the analysis of court data. 
The cases that end up in court, and especially 
those that end with a judgment on the merits 
in the first instance and are then appealed, 
are unlikely to be representative of the popu-
lation of court cases, let alone of all disputes. 
This means that it is difficult to draw broader 
lessons on the use of secrecy by companies 
from these court data. The breakdown of 
cases by industry in Lerner’s study reveals 
a lot of dispersion of cases across industries. 
However, most cases are in industries where 
patents are either not available, or firms tra-
ditionally rely on secrecy and copyright, e.g., 
business services and computer program-
ming, respectively. The data also show that 
secrecy may be difficult to enforce in court. 
In slightly less than 40 percent of cases that 
ended with judgment, misappropriation of 
trade secrets was found. Damage awards 
average $1.5 million, which Lerner (2006) 
notes is a lot lower than the damages typi-
cally awarded in patent cases. This agrees 
with the view that, on average, patents pro-
tect more valuable inventions than secrecy. 
Almeling et al. (2010, 2011) collect data on 
trade secrecy cases in federal, as well as state 
courts across the United States. Almeling 
et al. face the same challenges in their data 
collection as Lerner (2006), which means 
they only have data on trade secrecy cases 
in state appellate courts. All in all, they col-
lect 394 trade secrecy cases in federal district 
courts and 358 trade secrecy cases in state 
appellate courts for the period 1950–2008 
and 1995–2009, respectively. The data show 
that there was strong growth in trade secrecy 
cases over the past two decades. In 85 (93) 
percent of federal (state) court cases, the 
alleged misappropriator was known to the 
35 Another problem with the analysis of litigation of 
trade secrecy cases is that they are difficult to identify in 
court records because they usually figure under much 
broader categories, such as contract law.
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owner of the trade secret, as he/she was 
either a (former) employee or business part-
ner. Most trade secrecy cases involve secrets 
on technical information and know-how, cus-
tomer lists, and internal business informa-
tion. There are hardly any cases on negative 
secrets (i.e., what does not work). Similar to 
Lerner (2006), Almeling et al. find a win rate 
of 45 and 41 percent for federal and state 
cases, respectively. It appears that enforcing 
trade secrecy vis-à-vis an employee is easier, 
most likely because discovery (which can 
be regarded as an important barrier to the 
enforcement of secrecy) is easier.
Court data offer an interesting opportu-
nity to empirically measure the use of trade 
secrecy by firms. This allows one to study 
the characteristics of (a nonrandom set of) 
companies that rely on secrecy and the infor-
mation that was protected by secrecy. The 
limited data on damages offers additional evi-
dence on the value of trade secrets. However 
interesting these data are, it remains unclear 
what they tell us about the use of trade 
secrets, their characteristics and value in the 
population of firms.
4.2. Combined Patent–Secrecy Strategy
There is hardly any broad empirical evi-
dence on whether firms in fact pursue the 
combined patent–secrecy strategy for a 
single invention, what its determinants are, 
and what its consequences on performance 
and innovation are. This is explained by the 
fact that the empirical analysis of the use of 
patents in combination with secrecy is chal-
lenging. With firm-level data, it is impossible 
to determine exactly what is protected by 
which protection instrument. The combined 
use of patents and secrecy has to be identi-
fied at the invention or product level. Not 
only are different elements of an invention 
often protected by patents or secrecy, pat-
ents and secrecy may also be used to protect 
the same element at different stages of the 
innovative process. Anton, Greene, and Yao 
(2006: 9) state, “[b]ecause innovations are 
rarely composed of a monolithic piece of 
knowledge, a combination of patenting and 
secrecy is common.”
Theoretical models tend to focus on the 
invention-level and tackle the question of 
which protection tool is most suitable for this 
particular invention. It has proven difficult 
to translate these theory models into empiri-
cal research because the available firm-level 
data cannot distinguish whether patents and 
secrecy are used for one or more particular 
inventions. Indeed, data surveys that are 
commonly used for this type of analysis (like 
the CIS) are unable to tell whether firms 
use secrecy and patents for the same inven-
tions and whether they apply to the different 
stages of the innovation process, where pat-
ents versus secrecy might be differentially 
important. 
Graham and Hegde (2012) offer some evi-
dence by looking at the possibility to main-
tain patents unpublished until grant. The 
America Inventor’s Protection Act (AIPA) 
of 1999 was designed to eliminate this pos-
sibility. It required publication of any pat-
ent application after eighteen months, but 
offered an opt out. If no patent protection 
is sought in other jurisdictions, the applicant 
could still choose to maintain the applica-
tion unpublished until grant. Graham and 
Hegde look at all patent grants filed with 
the USPTO between 1996 and 2005 to find 
that post-AIPA (2001–05), 7.5 percent of fil-
ings opt out. The largest share of assignees 
opting out is found in information and com-
munication technologies (ICT). The authors 
find no evidence for small applicants more 
frequently opting out than large applicants. 
For small applicants, there is also a positive 
correlation between patent value and not 
choosing to opt out. This would suggest that 
the combination of patenting and secrecy in 
the form of delayed publication is not cho-
sen for more valuable inventions. The evi-
dence by Graham and Hegde (2012) looks 
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at a very specific type of combining patent-
ing with secrecy. The study is also subject to 
considerable selection bias, because forego-
ing patenting in other jurisdictions is very 
costly in the case of any valuable invention. 
No doubt, this explains the fact that opting 
out is most frequent in ICT technologies, 
which are used by a sector that engages in 
patent portfolio racing (a type of strategic 
patenting) where most individual patents 
are not that important, but quantity matters. 
Nevertheless, it illustrates one way in which 
these two appropriation mechanisms, which 
are in principle substitutes, can be employed 
in combination for the same invention.
4.3. No Patent, No Secrecy—Disclosure
Despite a well-developed body of theoret-
ical work on the use of disclosure by com-
panies, there is a lack of empirical analysis. 
Merges (2004) discusses the role that dis-
closure plays in two specific examples: the 
Merck Gene Index and IBM’s investment in 
Linux. In 1995, the pharmaceutical company 
Merck created a public database in which it 
discloses gene sequences and makes them 
publicly available. Merck’s motivation was to 
prevent patenting in this area, which would 
affect Merck’s business because it widely uses 
gene sequences as an input. The logic is sim-
ilar in the case of IBM’s investment in Linux. 
The open source operating system offers 
a public domain alternative to Microsoft’s 
Windows platform. Since Microsoft’s domi-
nance in the operating system market raises 
input costs for IBM, its investment in Linux 
offers an opportunity to build an IP-free 
system, which would lower the costs of an 
essential input for IBM. These examples 
illustrate the strategic use of disclosure by 
companies.
Somewhat broader empirical evidence 
is provided by Henkel and Pangerl (2008), 
who report on the qualitative evidence col-
lected from fifty-six interviews (in 2005 and 
2006) with thirty-seven large publicly traded 
 manufacturing companies and patent prac-
titioners in Germany. The interviews reveal 
that defensive publishing is indeed widely 
used. One of the main motivations for pub-
lishing instead of patenting is the lower cost 
of publishing. Obviously, this argument 
weighs more heavily for lower value inven-
tions, or for those inventions that are com-
plementary to patented inventions and can 
therefore be protected, to some extent, by 
them. Still, patent publications are often 
used as a vehicle for defensive publications 
and the cost savings arise from not having 
to prosecute the patent to grant. Defensive 
publications are mainly seen as a way to 
maintain freedom to operate. To ensure 
freedom to operate, companies choose to 
disclose, instead of maintaining the inven-
tion secret. Nevertheless, the interviewees 
indicate that there are ways of legally dis-
closing while maintaining de facto secrecy, 
for example by choosing obscure places (or 
foreign languages) for publication, instead 
of standard outlets such as IP.COM. Such 
a strategy, of course, contradicts the theo-
retical models in which defensive publica-
tions signal costs or raise the prior art bar. 
According to Henkel and Pangerl (2008), 
there is no evidence for disclosure to be 
used strategically in patent/R&D races. 
Companies claimed that they are usually 
not sufficiently aware of their position in 
a race to use disclosure strategically. Even 
if companies knew their position in such 
a race, companies still indicated that they 
would not rely on strategic disclosure for 
fear over encouraging entry of new com-
petitors, contradicting the assumptions of 
some of the theoretical models.
4.4. The Choice of Other Forms of IP
Unlike informal methods of IP protec-
tion such as secrecy and lead time, the 
alternative formal methods of IP protec-
tion such as trademarks and copyright are 
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not  necessarily substitutes for patents, but 
instead offer the ability to protect differ-
ent aspects of an innovation. Although the 
theoretical literature focuses on the choice 
between secrecy and formal IP in the form 
of patents, in reality, the use of other forms 
of formal IP, especially trademarks and 
copyright, is far more widespread. This 
section briefly reviews the relatively sparse 
empirical evidence on the use of these 
methods of protection.
4.4.1. Trademarks
Trademarks are probably the most widely 
used method of registered IP protection, as 
they are available to essentially any firm sell-
ing a good or service. In some cases, they 
can represent an extremely valuable and 
long-lived brand, but most end up being of 
little value or having a relatively short life. 
Empirical studies into the effect of trade-
marking on firm performance have been 
scarce, although this is changing with the 
advent of computerized data availability at 
Trademark Offices, notably the Office for 
Harmonisation in the Internal Market of 
the European Union.36 Most of the available 
studies look at the association of trademark 
ownership with firm value and typically find 
that the average trademark is valued posi-
tively but by less than the average patent, 
and also that trademarks are more important 
to service sector firms.
Seethamraju (2003) analyzed the value of 
trademarks in 237 U.S. firms over 1993–97, 
finding a positive role for trademarking on 
sales and also on market value. Griffiths, 
Jensen, and Webster (2011) used a sample of 
slightly less than 2,700 large Australian firms 
over 1989–2002 and found that the stock of 
trademarks was a significant determinant 
of profits, but with a smaller impact than 
36 Very recently, the USPTO has released a comprehen-
sive U.S. trademark database (Graham et al. 2013), but it is 
too early to see research using these data.
either patents or registered designs. They 
also found that the value of a trademark was 
rising over their data period. Their work is 
consistent with the earlier work of Bosworth 
and Rogers (2001), who had used a sample 
of sixty Australian firms from 1994–96 and 
found a positive but insignificant coefficient 
for trademarks in the market value equation 
that also included R&D and patents. They 
also noted that trademarks were somewhat 
more important to nonmanufacturing firms 
than manufacturing firms. 
Greenhalgh and Rogers (2007b) analyze 
a large sample of publicly quoted UK firms 
from 1996–2000, with both manufacturing 
and services firms being included. They look 
at whether any trademark activity, and also 
the effects of increasing trademark inten-
sity, impact on performance, as measured 
by Tobin’s q, or the ratio of market value to 
the book value of the tangible assets. The 
results indicate that a firm’s stock market 
value is positively associated with trademark 
activity (as well as with R&D and patents). 
They find larger differences between firms 
with and without trademarks in the service 
sector than for manufacturing. They also 
find bigger differences in Tobin’s q when 
the services firm is applying for European 
Community trademarks, rather than just 
applying for UK marks. When looking at 
intensities (i.e., the ratio of trademarks to 
assets), they find an increase in the intensity 
of Community trademarks raises market 
value for both manufacturing and services, 
but this relationship weakened over their 
data period. Since there was an increase in 
trademarks during the late 1990s, a fall in 
the estimated value of such activity might 
be expected. Greenhalgh and Rogers’s 
 interpretation of their findings is that, in 
general, trade mark activity  proxies for a 
range of other, unobservable, firm-level 
characteristics, including innovation that 
increase both productivity and product 
prices. 
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Greenhalgh and Rogers (2007b) also ana-
lyze whether greater trademark intensity 
raises productivity growth. They find that 
higher trademark intensity has some posi-
tive association with productivity growth in 
services, but the results are relatively weak 
for manufacturing firms. These results for 
the relationship between productivity and 
trademarks were broadly consistent with 
those derived for their quoted firm sample 
using the market value approach, suggest-
ing that stock markets are efficient in esti-
mating the likely benefits of new intangible 
assets, and that managers are not just seek-
ing trademarks to follow a “management 
fad.” Even so, the marginal returns to extra 
trademarks per firm were diminishing 
quite rapidly over the period, as indicated 
by exploration of the interaction of time 
trends with trademark intensity, suggesting 
decreasing returns to further proliferation 
of product variety.
Empirical evidence on the determinants 
of trademarking is similarly sparse. Jensen 
and Webster (2004) consider the increase 
in trademarking in Australia from 1976 to 
2002. They find that the increases are associ-
ated with a) increasing globalization, b) the 
growth of household income, c) an increase 
in service sector activity, and d) the fact 
that trademarking appears to be linked to 
increases in product innovation and design. 
Rogers and Greenhalgh (2006) consider UK 
financial service sector firms (1996–2000), 
finding that while larger firms account for 
more trademarks, the trademark to employ-
ment ratio is higher for small firms. They 
also investigate whether stock market listed 
firms and more diversified firms trademark 
more, but find no role for either factor.
4.4.2. Copyright
Empirical analysis of the value of copy-
right is difficult since there is (currently) 
no legal requirement to register creative 
work.37 Nevertheless, there are a few stud-
ies that generate some information on the 
economic role of copyright. Country-level 
studies provide some background. A study 
on the United States during the period 
when copyright had to be registered (and 
renewed) concluded that around 80 percent 
of copyright had little economic value (see 
Landes and Posner 2003, who looked at the 
1910–1991 period). This result is consistent 
with the generally very skew distribution of 
value for a wide range of innovation mea-
sures (Scherer 1998).
Baker and Cunningham (2009) look at 
aggregate quarterly copyright registration 
in the United States and Canada during the 
1986–2005 period and how it responded to 
changes in the copyright term extensions 
and other changes to the law, finding a small 
positive impact of term extension. However, 
there are some problems with the empiri-
cal setup, due to the lack of a requirement 
for registration unless legal enforcement is 
contemplated, and also due to the timing of 
such registration. Png and Wang (2009) look 
at the impact of copyright extensions on the 
production of movies in twenty-three OECD 
countries, and found no statistically robust 
evidence that copyright term extension was 
associated with higher movie production. This 
result is not surprising, since the net pres-
ent value of such a twenty-year increase is 
very low (if a standard discount rate is used). 
They also looked at the impact of European 
revisions to copyright law in response to 
the EU’s Rental Directive (which arguably 
 strengthened the rights of movie producers 
to receive returns from rentals) and found 
no effect. Li, MacGarvie, and Moser (2014) 
use data at the book-level for the period 
1790–1840 to estimate the effect of copyright 
37 Historically some countries, including the United 
States, required copyright to be registered prior to 
enforcement, but under TRIPs, countries cannot make 
such a requirement.
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extension through the British Copyright Act 
of 1814 on book prices. The authors show that 
the copyright act effectively prolonged copy-
right protection only for dead authors, which 
allows them to compare changes due to the 
term extension for books by dead and living 
authors. The results indicate a large positive 
effect on book prices, that is, the price of a 
book by a dead author significantly increased 
in response to the term extension.
Waldfogel (2012) argues that it is impor-
tant to look at the quality of music created, 
as well as the quantity sold, as an indicator 
of the impact on consumer surplus from the 
rise of low and free methods of distribution 
over the Internet. He uses three indica-
tors of quality: critics’ ratings, and the rela-
tive taste for recordings of various vintages 
(before and after the rise of Napster) as 
measured both by sales and airplay. All three 
indicate that quality has slightly increased, 
rather than declining, with the advent of 
the Internet and the changes in distribution 
it has induced, suggesting that increases in 
free or lower-cost access have so far not had 
a negative impact on the incentives for the 
creation of musical recordings. 
Firm-level studies on copyright are more 
difficult. One approach is to use data on court 
actions. Baker and Cunningham (2006) look 
at the effect of U.S. federal court decisions 
that broadened copyright on the market 
value of firms. They find that a new copyright 
statute can raise return on equity by between 
0.4 percent and 2.1 percent, while a high 
court decision can raise returns by 0.1 per-
cent to 1.1 percent. In a similar type of study, 
Mazeh and Rogers (2006) find that plaintiffs 
in copyright disputes have higher market 
values than a peer group of similar firms. 
Overall, however, the empirical  evidence on 
the value of copyright, especially at the firm-
level, is sparse.
It is probably worth emphasizing that, for 
copyright as for other formal IP protection 
methods, there is a great difference between 
its role as an ex ante incentive and as an ex 
post profit generator. It is probably safe to 
say that there is very little evidence that 
the incentive to produce creative works is 
impacted by term extensions of the kind we 
have seen recently, but that does not mean 
that the firms holding the very small share of 
copyrighted works that have a long lifetime 
(think of Disney Films) will not experience 
market value effects in response to exten-
sions of the term.
4.4.3. Multiple and Overlapping IP Use
As pointed out above, firms typically have 
more than one invention and, furthermore, 
tend to bundle different IP protection tools 
(e.g., Levin et al. 1987). In fact, most of the 
surveys that ask firms about their prefer-
ences for various IP protection methods find 
that their answers are correlated, implying 
that firms have a general taste for IP that 
manifests itself as a preference for all the dif-
ferent methods.38
Even when restricting attention to regis-
tered IP rights, the empirical analysis of IP 
bundles remains challenging because with 
firm-level data, it is impossible to deter-
mine exactly what is protected by which IP 
protection instrument. The existing litera-
ture on the use of IP bundles has focused 
on the question of whether different forms 
of IP act as complements or substitutes 
(i.e., whether the return to using one type 
of IP increases or decreases in the use of 
another form of IP). Graham and Somaya 
(2006) suggest that IP protection methods 
38 In unpublished work, Hall (2013) shows this for UK 
firms. After controlling for firm size, age, export status, 
ownership, R&D, and two-digit industry, the correlations 
among the propensity to use four different kinds of for-
mal IP (patents, trademarks, copyright, and design rights) 
range from 0.55 to 0.7, slightly higher than the uncondi-
tional correlations of 0.45 to 0.6. This suggests that, either 
firms have heterogeneous tastes for IP in general, or there 
is considerable heterogeneity in the importance of innova-
tion to different firms, even controlling for basic character-
istics like size and industry. 
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are often  complements, rather than sub-
stitutes, and offer as an example computer 
software, where copyright, trademarks, and 
patents are often used together. The diffi-
culty in examining the use of these methods 
empirically is that copyright is often unreg-
istered and trademark data can be rather 
noisy. The authors address this problem 
by looking at changes in litigation rates for 
copyright and trademarks within firms over 
time. They show that after they control for 
firm size, age, R&D, income, managerial 
attention to IP, firm IP resources, and firm 
fixed effects, the residuals in the copyright 
and trademark litigation rates are correlated, 
suggesting complementary use of the two 
above and beyond the overall IP profile of 
the firm. Llerena and Millot (2013) analyze 
possible complementarities between patents 
and trademarks. They forward the theoreti-
cal idea that trademarks can complement 
patents by providing exclusivity for a prod-
uct’s goodwill that was built while a patent is 
in force. In contrast, patents and trademarks 
act as substitutes as long as a patent is in 
force because competition is precluded even 
without trademark protection. The empiri-
cal evidence provides rather weak evidence 
for such complementarities, although there 
are interesting differences across industries 
with patents and trademarks acting as com-
plements in pharmaceuticals and substitutes 
in the computer and electrical equipment 
industry. Nevertheless, these results have 
to be interpreted with caution because only 
data at the firm-level is available to test these 
relationships empirically. 
5. Patents versus Secrecy: Welfare
The empirical fact that many firms choose 
to use secrecy, rather than patents, has 
prompted various theoretical models that 
analyze the impact of this choice on social 
welfare. In our context, one of the issues at 
stake concerns the role of disclosure, where 
here this is defined as the full description of 
the invention contained in the patent docu-
ment. One of the basic rationales of the pat-
ent system is to encourage disclosure, since 
this prevents the duplication of research 
and, once the patent has expired, allows 
“those skilled in the art” to quickly replicate 
the invention. This rationale is referred to as 
the contract theory of patents by legal schol-
ars, as opposed to the reward theory (which 
focuses on incentives to invent). The role of 
disclosure in contract theory is very specific: 
prevent duplication and allow rapid diffu-
sion once the patent has expired (for more 
detailed discussion see Anderson 2011).
In several of the surveys mentioned pre-
viously, firms or inventors were asked for 
a qualitative assessment as to how impor-
tant patents were as a source of informa-
tion for a particular invention. Cockburn 
and Henderson’s (2003) survey data shows 
that only a third of respondents—who are 
mostly IP counsels—conduct a prior art 
search before starting new R&D or prod-
uct development. This may have multiple 
reasons. For example, Lemley (2008) is one 
of many with experience as practitioners 
to suggest that IT and biotech firms in the 
United States purposefully ignore existing 
patent documents in order to avoid charges 
of willful infringement, and that researchers 
in these fields execute their research with-
out conducting prior art searches. Holbrook 
(2006) suggests also that the eighteen-month 
lag between application and publication 
(and possibilities to delay publication) ren-
ders the information disclosed by patents 
largely obsolete in a range of fast moving 
industries.39 Furthermore, restrictions on 
the legitimate use of patented inventions for 
39  Holbrook (2006) notes that, in the United States, in 
contrast to granted patents, to infringe on a patent after it 
was published but before it was granted, the infringer had 
to be aware of the publication. This creates incentives not 
to review patent publications before they are granted.
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experimentation could limit the use of pat-
ent disclosure. However, Ouellette (2012) 
provides contrasting evidence that suggests 
that managers of nanotechnology firms find 
it useful to read patent documents. There is 
also regional variation: Cohen et al. (2002) 
find that Japanese inventors are twice as 
likely as U.S. inventors to obtain informa-
tion about future research directions from 
patents. U.S. companies, in contrast, gener-
ally prefer other sources of information over 
patents. Walsh and Nagaoka (2009) confirm 
these large differences in the importance of 
patents between U.S. and Japanese inven-
tors, with Japanese inventors about twice 
as likely to use patents to acquire informa-
tion. In line with these studies, Gambardella, 
Harhoff, and Nagaoka (2011) find for their 
large inventor survey (around 20,000 inven-
tors in Europe, the United States, and 
Japan) that patents are particularly important 
sources of information in a small number of 
technical areas—such as polymers, organic 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, petrochemical 
and materials chemistry—and that Japanese 
inventors assign greater importance to infor-
mation in patents than either European or 
U.S. inventors. Apart from asking inventors 
about the importance of patents as a source 
of information, Gambardella, Harhoff, and 
Nagaoka (2011) also ask inventors to quantify 
the time saved in an invention process when 
compared to a situation in which the infor-
mation from patents had not been available. 
This offers a way of quantifying potential cost 
savings incurred by inventors due to knowl-
edge of the patent literature. Time savings 
from disclosures follow a highly skew distri-
bution, with estimated median values of 5.9 
hours and mean values of 11.5 hours. There 
is considerable heterogeneity across techni-
cal fields—median values range between 
one hour (digital communication technol-
ogy) and thirty-six hours (organic chemicals). 
Thus, in fields where patents have strong 
impact on appropriation, such as chemicals 
and  pharmaceuticals, disclosure effects also 
appear to matter the most. Still, even in those 
sectors costs savings from patent disclosure 
implied by these figures are, at best, modest. 
It is possible, however, that disclosure through 
patents has other effects that are not captured 
by the survey question, such as whether read-
ing patent publications avoids duplication of 
research, either by not even commencing a 
new research project or by leading the inven-
tors to abort an ongoing project early. But it 
is hard to gauge how important these consid-
erations are, empirically. Moreover, measur-
ing the effect of disclosure only based on how 
important the patent literature is for innova-
tion may be too narrow. If there is additional 
(informal) disclosure, which is enabled by a 
patent (if the invention had to be kept secret, 
it could not be informally discussed), the dis-
closure effects could be substantially larger. 
Quantifying any such informal disclosure 
effects is challenging, however.
There are relatively few theoretical papers 
that examine the welfare implications of pat-
ent system design in the presence of the pat-
ent–secrecy choice. Earlier, we discussed the 
pioneering work of Scotchmer and Green 
(1990), who focus on the welfare conse-
quences for subsequent invention induced 
by the choice of first-to-file priority versus 
first-to-invent, showing that neither system 
can achieve first best disclosure and inven-
tion levels. Denicolò and Franzoni (2004) 
study the welfare consequences of prior-user 
rights. Using a model of an inventor and a 
follower who may try to imitate, they show 
that when there are prior-user rights (the 
right of the first inventor to use an inven-
tion which it had kept secret even if it is later 
patented by a third party),  second inventors 
will not patent in equilibrium. When a pat-
ent system is optimized (that is, when pat-
ent life is optimal for welfare), introducing 
prior-user rights cannot improve welfare. In 
the more realistic situation where patent life 
is seldom optimal, the incentive to innovate 
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is increased by the introduction of prior-
user rights, but there is more duplication of 
research, and the welfare effects are unclear. 
They conclude that prior-user rights may be 
optimal in highly competitive settings with 
underinvestment in R&D, and also that 
trade secrecy is seldom preferable to patent-
ing, from a welfare perspective. 
Cugno and Ottoz (2006) present a model 
in which inventions that are kept secret can 
be licensed. They assume that innovators 
have already obtained the innovation and 
only face the decision whether to patent or 
keep it secret. Cugno and Ottoz also assume 
that patented inventions cannot be imitated 
without infringement, that is, patents protect 
an invention perfectly. In this case, the only 
relevant variable determining profits from 
patenting is patent lifetime. In the case of 
secrecy, competitors can legally duplicate 
the invention at some positive cost. It is this 
threat of duplication that leads the innovator 
to license the secret innovation to competi-
tors to keep them from imitating. A simple 
comparison of welfare under the assump-
tion that licensing does not entail transac-
tion costs reveals that the ex post welfare loss 
associated with patenting is larger than that 
for secrecy. This result is based on a number 
of rather unrealistic assumptions such as that 
patents perfectly prevent imitation or that 
the decision to patent or maintain an inven-
tion secret does not affect R&D incentives. 
So its applicability is doubtful. 
6. Conclusions
Although not ideal, due to the level of 
aggregation (firm level, rather than prod-
uct level) and the qualitative nature of the 
 questions, the survey evidence we reviewed 
gives a rather consistent overall impression of 
IP use and its importance for firms. A num-
ber of valuable stylized facts about inven-
tion, company, and industry  characteristics 
that influence the choice between  patenting, 
secrecy, and other formal, as well as infor-
mal, mechanisms emerge from these sur-
veys. Certainly the most robust finding is 
heterogeneity in the use of patents across 
industries. Patents play an important role in 
the pharmaceutical and chemical industry, 
and sometimes in the medical instrument 
industry and parts of the machinery sector. 
We also learn that most firms consider pat-
ents a relatively ineffective means to protect-
ing their inventions. Instead, they favor a 
range of different informal protection mech-
anisms, above all lead time. But companies 
also regard secrecy as more effective than 
patents. Finally, from the survey evidence 
it is apparent that firms tend to treat vari-
ous kinds of IP protection as complements, 
in the sense that use of one makes it highly 
probably they will use the others. 
From our review of the theoretical litera-
ture, the heterogeneity of firm behavior with 
respect to IP protection should come as no 
surprise: theory suggests that the nature of 
innovation (product versus process and dis-
crete versus complex) along with the degree 
of competition among innovators and in the 
product market are the key factors that shape 
a firm’s propensity to use secrecy, rather 
than patents. Since these factors also vary 
across time and across countries, we should 
also expect to see the propensity to patent 
varying. Even in patent-intensive industries, 
secrecy can be important in protecting pro-
cess innovations. This apparent inconsistency 
with theory is due to the fact that many firms 
have a bundle of inventions and innovations, 
and their different characteristics may call 
for different protection mechanisms.
Our review also highlights that most of the 
theoretical work concentrates on the choice 
of patents versus secrecy. The binary choice 
between two substitutes is a convenient 
assumption that helps identify a range of fac-
tors that influence the decision to use pat-
ents or secrecy. One of the key determinants 
of the choice is the disclosure required by 
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 patents and the strategic options (the possi-
bility to influence competitors’ behavior) that 
disclosure through patent publications con-
fers to companies. The available survey data, 
however, suggest that patents and secrecy are 
often used as complements. Moreover, the 
focus on patents is too narrow, as trademarks 
and copyright are far more widely used for-
mal IP rights than patents. Similarly, secrecy 
is not the most effective and frequently used 
informal appropriation method. The narrow 
focus of the theoretical literature creates a 
gap between the theoretical models and the 
empirical work in this area.
An important limitation in most of the 
existing empirical work, relative to the the-
ory, is the absence of data at the invention 
level. Theory models the choice between 
patenting and secrecy at the invention level; 
most empirical studies rely on firm-level 
data. Since companies pursue a multitude of 
activities, this makes it difficult to infer from 
the firm-level data information on choices 
made at the invention-level. 
From a policy point of view, the lack of 
a better theoretical understanding of the 
trade-off that companies face when choos-
ing between the large range formal and 
informal IP methods represents a challenge. 
The impact of changes to the patent system 
or the law governing trade secrecy depends 
on their effect on the trade-off between the 
use of different appropriation mechanisms. 
Our review suggests that a simplistic view of 
this trade-off, with companies patenting by 
default patentable inventions, is misplaced. 
The available empirical evidence strongly 
suggests that, in most industries, patents 
are not seen as an effective tool to appropri-
ate returns to innovation—especially not in 
isolation. Instead, companies appear to use 
a combination of different appropriation 
mechanisms even for the same invention. 
For policy, an improved understanding of 
possible interactions and overlaps between 
the different mechanisms would be useful.
Our review shows that there is ample room 
for further research in this area. However, fur-
ther research in the form of additional cross-
sectional survey evidence may not be the best 
way forward. As discussed above, survey data 
in this area have some built-in limitations that 
restrict the insights that can be derived from 
the analysis of these data. Despite the limita-
tions, the various robust stylized facts gener-
ated by the survey data are useful in guiding 
further theoretical and empirical work. One 
such stylized fact is the joint use of different 
forms of IP, including the joint use of patents 
and secrecy. It might be worthwhile to relax 
the assumption that patents and secrecy are 
mutually exclusive and to consider a more 
complex and realistic scenario in which com-
panies employ different mechanisms to pro-
tect the same invention. From an empirical 
point of view, the small literature that has 
used the combination of invention-level data 
with exogenous changes in the legal regimes 
governing the patent–secrecy trade-off offers 
the most insightful findings. If patent protec-
tion is not available, there is still innovation, 
albeit innovation that can be more easily pro-
tected by informal mechanisms including 
secrecy. This literature, however, is based on 
the same type of data and setting: inventions 
exhibited at fairs between the mid-nineteenth 
and mid-twentieth centuries. It would be use-
ful to have these findings confirmed by data 
from different settings. 
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